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ABSTRACT 
First Responders Knowledge and Training Needs 
 
Heather Corinne Galada, MPH Candidate 
Hernando Perez, Ph.D., MPH, CIH, CSP, HHS (advisor) 
Patrick Gurian, Ph.D. (preceptor) 
  
 
 
Objective: The 2001 anthrax attacks highlighted the need to protect first responders from 
bioterrorism attacks.  While there have been updates to response protocols, the focus of these 
protocols varies,and first responders may still be unprepared. This study seeks to address the 
problem of a lack of a specific, universal bioterrorism training program for first responders.  The 
research 1) determines current training practices for bioterrorism incidents, 2) evaluates the 
effectiveness of current training procedures, 3) investigates differences in training programs 
based on geography and organization, and 4) assesses attitudes and perceptions of bioterrorism 
and training.  It also identifies areas of weakness and suggests where future training efforts 
should be focused.  
Methods: First Responders Knowledge and Training Needs is a descriptive study based on 
interviews and a survey. The study used a questionnaire containing a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative questions. Subjects included 70 first responders from the United States who 
were recruited at a national conference and through personal and professional 
networking. Subjects’ intuitive assessments of dispersion were  contrasted with results of simple 
dispersion models, the Gaussian puff equation for an outdoor release (Long et al. 2006) and a 
completely mixed compartment model for an indoor release (Hong et al. 2010).   
Results: 17.4% of participants did not have any training regarding bioterrorism, while a plurality 
of participants (29%) had received awareness level training, which is designed for those who 
require the skills necessary to recognize and report an incident or are likely to witness or 
investigate an incident.  Less than one quarter of participants (24%) had on-line training, and the 
majority (39%) was trained in-residence at their facility.  Less than half of the participants had 
been trained on how to use on-site testing devices, how to handle an indoor release scenario, or 
how to handle an outdoor release scenario.  Low confidence levels were found regarding the use 
of on-scene testing devices and responding to outdoor release scenarios.  This low confidence 
responding to an outdoor release where weak evidence was found that participants underestimate 
downwind risks and overestimate anthrax transfers perpendicular to wind direction during an 
outdoor release.  Regarding personal protective equipment, participants gave varied responses to 
the level they would choose and the location at which they would dress.   
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Conclusions: A rapid response to a bioterrorism attack is critical for ensuring the safety of 
American citizens and can save costs associated with medical attention, cleanup, and 
decontamination efforts (Keim and Kaufmann, 1999 Educating first responders on the proper 
level and use of personal protective equipment is necessary to ensure they are protected and do 
not infect their colleagues or family.  Utilizing alternative training programs, such as a “train-the-
trainer” approach or on-line programs could also increase the number for first responders who 
have the knowledge and ability to respond to a bioterrorism attack.  
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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 After the 2001 anthrax attacks, the need to protect first responders from a bioterrorism 
attack was highlighted.  The lack of an effective bioterrorism preparedness protocol resulted in a 
number of civilian illnesses and deaths caused by anthrax exposure (Gursky, Inglesby, and 
O’Toole, 2003).  Several first responders were exposed to Bacillus anthracis spores due to a lack 
of training and understanding of potentially contaminated areas.  In addition to protecting first 
responders, addressing the need for enhanced training will help safeguard the public.  Without 
treatment, the risk of mortality for inhalational anthrax is nearly 100% (DHS, 2009).  Even with 
treatment, those who were ill from anthrax and treated during the 2001 anthrax attacks still faced 
a 45% risk of fatality (Holty, Bravata, Liu, Olshen, McDonald, and Owens, 2006).   The need to 
protect families and co-workers of first responders is also a high priority concern, as was 
demonstrated by the off-site contamination by equipment and clothing from the Capitol police 
Hazardous Device Unit who had responded to the 2001 anthrax attacks (Meehan, Rosenstein, 
Gillen et al., 2004).  In addition, efficient training programs may reduce the costs involved with 
unnecessary cleanup and decontamination efforts, antibiotic distribution, and medical attention 
(Keim and Kaufmann, 1999). 
 An assessment of the response to the 2001 anthrax attacks could help in the development 
of improved and standardized response protocols.  However, there has still not been a 
comprehensive published analysis of the response (Gursky et al., 2003).   As of May 2010, the 
National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been working on new standards 
based on the 2001 attacks.  Currently, these standards are not published, but they plan to be 
released this year.  Additionally, the peer-reviewed literature lacks studies assessing training and 
knowledge gaps of first responders in regards to on-scene decision making. Some studies have, 
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however, investigated community level response strategies, focusing on medical professionals 
and corporations (Flowers et al., 2002; Wrigley et al., 2003; Ablah et al., 2006). One study, 
including German firefighters responding to a simulated bioterrorism incident, evaluated the 
effectiveness of a specific training module.  Problems with the response tactics were found, but 
the study did not elicit the firefighters perceptions on the effectiveness of the training they had 
received (Lenz and Richter, 2009).  Abatemarco et al. (2007) have published one study that 
identified knowledge and perceptions of emergency medical technicians (EMTs), but this 
research focused mainly on respirator use in the event of a chemical or biological attack.  
Abatemarco et al.’s study involved 17 volunteer EMTs participants from Hunterdon County, NJ.  
The participants were given a pre-training survey with 20 questions assessing their attitudes and 
perceptions toward bioterrorism, biological agents, and respirator use.  Participants then took 
part in a training program which included background information on bioterrorism, biological 
agents, respiratory health and protection, and fit-testing.  After the training session, a post-
training survey was administered.  Statistically significant changes in knowledge and perceptions 
were found after the training, suggesting a need for training to address these knowledge gaps.  
Additionally, the authors mention the lack of background and baseline data on first responder 
knowledge and training needs as a major data gap.  In light of this missing information, this 
study aims to help fill that gap and provide information on necessary training procedures and 
protocols for on-scene decision making. 
This study seeks to address the problem of a lack of a specific, universal bioterrorism 
training program for first responders.  The research evaluates the effectiveness of current training 
procedures for first responders to a bioterrorism event.  It also identifies areas of weakness and 
suggests where future training efforts should be focused.  
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BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Anthrax as a Weapon 
 Bacillus anthracis has a number of properties that make it ideal for weaponization: the 
spores are very stable, spores cause infections through the respiratory tract, and there is a high 
case-fatality rate for inhalation (Meehan et al., 2004).  Currently over a dozen countries have a 
biological warfare program, and terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda have shown interest in 
biological weapons (Davis and Bennett, 2004).   The Iraqi bioweapons program has reporting 
over 22,000 gallons of anthrax, with over 2,000 of these gallons being weaponized (Missouri 
Department of Health and Senior Services, 2004).  The United States Army Medical Research 
Division for Infectious Disease ranks anthrax as the most likely agent to be utilized in a 
biological attack (Kortpeter and Parker, 1999). As such, planning and training for an anthrax 
attack is necessary to include in public health preparedness plans. 
 Inhalation exposure after an anthrax attack can occur through both primary and secondary 
aerosolization.  Primary aerosolization occurs during the initial release from a disseminating 
device or handling a package.  Secondary aerosolization/ occurs when settled anthrax particles 
are resuspended (Meehan et al., 2004). While inhalational anthrax cases have been reported in 
United States in the 20th century, the first cases of intentional anthrax release resulting in an 
outbreak were not documented until 2001 (Jernigan, Stephens, Ashford, et al., 2001; Sanderson, 
Stoddard, Ect et al., 2003).  Earlier inhalational exposures were associated with occupational 
exposures from processing contaminated animal fibers (Sanderson et al, 2003).   
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Current State of Training Programs 
While there has been a great deal of recent activity regarding bioterrorism preparedness 
in federal, state, and local public health agencies since the 2001 anthrax attacks, many of the 
developments and programs are inconsistently shared and vary across government levels 
(Gursky et al., 2007; Fraser and Brown, 2000). Federal government agencies, including the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of Transportation (DOT), 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), American Society for Testing and Materials (ATSM), 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and National Institute for Occupational Health and 
Safety (NIOSH) have published guidelines and protocols for biological terrorism attacks, yet 
these protocols vary between agencies (CDC, 2010; DOT 2008; ATSM, 2006; DHS 2008; 
NIOSH, 2004).  Even in the military sector, the Department of Defense has failed to prepare a 
procedural solution to a biological threat (Davis and Bennett, 2004). In 1999 and 2000, $730 
million was appropriated by Congress for bioterrorism preparedness programs in local and state 
health departments.  In 2000 and 2001, bioterrorism exercises were conducted to assess the 
efficiency of response tactics (Jones, 2002).  A lack of coordination among state and federal 
agencies was highlighted in these mock attacks, and Congressional hearings emphasized the 
need for first responder training programs (Jones, 2002).  After the attacks in 2001, the 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, S.1765, and the Tauzin-Dingell bioterrorism measure, H.R.3448, 
were introduced (Jones, 2002).  Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, there has been an increase in 
funding and efforts to create and improve first responder training, yet there are still many gaps 
that need to be filled. In 2009, DHS drafted guidance for first responder procedures during a 
wide-area outdoor attack (Appendix D).  This guidance mainly addresses personal protective 
equipment, post-exposure prophylaxis and vaccination, and notes knowledge gaps regarding 
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methods of decontamination, isolation from contaminated areas, and understanding of dispersion 
(DHS, 2009).  This study will assess the effectiveness of the newly created training programs 
and highlight areas that need strengthening. 
Waeckerle et al. (2001) developed recommendations for training and planning initiatives 
for emergency physicians, emergency nurses, and emergency medical technicians in response to 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).  Their analysis, however, does not cover first responders 
such as the fire department or police personnel.  The authors point out that “one of the most 
critical elements of [training development] is to identify and analyze specific learner needs...in 
order to produce a list of performance-based learning objectives that is both comprehensive and 
relevant to particular job demands” (Waeckerle, Seamans, Whiteside, et al., 2001, p.598).   
Additional needs assessments have been carried out assessing physicians’ preparedness, needs, 
and ability to treat patients who have suffered from a bioterrorism attack (Sterling et al., 2005; 
Henreig et al., 2002; Shadel, et al., 2005).  This points directly the need for an analysis such as 
the one completed in this study. 
2001 Anthrax Attack Response 
 In the October 2001 anthrax attacks, B. anthracis spores were mailed to Washington 
D.C., New Jersey, New York, and Florida from Trenton, NJ. (Sanderson et al.,2003; Jernigan et 
al., 2001).  Four of the eleven total cases of inhalational anthrax were diagnosed in workers of a 
U.S. Postal Service processing and distribution center in Washington, D.C. The timeline below 
(Figure 1) describes the path of the anthrax-containing envelopes and the response: 
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Figure 1. Timeline of 2001 anthrax response in USPS building. Data to create timeline gathered 
from Sanderson et al., 2003
 
 
 
 
 
October 23, 2001: 
CDC investigators 
begin investigation 
October 23-28, 2001: 
CDC uses surface 
wipes, surface HEPA 
vacuum sock 
sampling, and air 
filter-sampling 
Cleaning of machines 
surfaces by HEPA 
vacuums and washing 
with sodium 
hypochlorite solution 
December 17-20, 
2001: CDC’s 2nd 
investigation; surface 
swab samples, HEPA 
vacuum sock 
samples, and air filter 
samples collected – 
spores still remain 
USPS building 
undergoes 
decontamination 
December 2003: 
USPS workers return 
to building 
October 11 2001: 
Envelopes containing 
B. anthracis spores 
enter USPS building 
October 12, 2001: 
Envelopes sorted and 
one is taken to 
government mail 
section and handled 
manually 
October 12, 2001: 
Envelope put on 
delivery truck to Hart 
Senate Office Building 
October 18, 2001: 
USPS contractor 
collects dry swab 
samples for detection 
of B. anthracis spores; 
total of 29 samples 
October 21, 2001: 
USPS building is 
evacuated; HVAC 
system shut down 
October 22: Results of 
contractor’s dry swabs 
become available: 14 
test positive 
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As shown in Figure 1, the response to anthrax was slow.  Ten days passed until the 
HVAC system in the USPS building was shut down and the building was evacuated.  It took 
another two days until the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) arrived to begin an 
investigation. Similar mistakes were made in the response to the anthrax that reached Senator 
Daschle’s office on Capitol Hill where the possibilities of cross-contamination were high 
(Martin, 2003).  During the Capitol Hill incident, over an hour passed until the anthrax threat 
was taken seriously and the police were notified.  An additional hour passed until the police 
arrived (anonymous, personal communication, October 2011). Such delays highlight the need for 
standardized, efficient training protocols. 
 In addition to the delay in response time, many additional problems were identified in the 
2001 response procedures.  First, a diluted bleach solution (sodium hypochlorite) was used to 
inactivate the B. anthracis spores at Capitol Hill, USPS Centers in Washington D.C. and 
Trenton, New Jersey, the Department of State in Washington D.C. and Boca Raton, Florida. 
(EPA, 2007).  Responders were first told to use a 5% bleach solution to decontaminate the 
buildings.  However, the 5% bleach solution was not effective, and live spores were found after 
decontamination.  Later, a 10% bleach solution was found to be effective, but did result in some 
response personnel getting rashes (anonymous, personal communication, October 2011).  
Additionally, many first responders put on their personal protective equipment approximately 
100 feet from the release site, resulting in their exposure.  The containment effort in the 2001 
response was not aggressive due to the vast amounts of uncertainty regarding responsibilities for 
duties and proper response procedures.  Treatment, however, was aggressive which saved many 
lives.  First responders in the 2001 attacks also underestimated the extent of contamination due to 
dispersion, such as the potential for an aerosol release to spread even to parts of the building 
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served by different HVAC systems, and the transfer of spores by tracking (anonymous, personal 
communication, October 2011). 
Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Models 
 A majority of the survey is based on the conceptual model shown in Figure 2.  This 
model visually represents the decisions first responders must make during a bioterrorism event.  
Previous training and confidence in reacting to a situation will influence these decisions.  This 
conceptual model was built based on discussions with experts, including Fire Chiefs, first 
responders involved in the 2001 anthrax attacks, and state preparedness coordinators.  The model 
was also influenced by the International Association of Fire Chiefs’ First Responder Decision 
Matrix (Appendix B).   
 In addition to the conceptual model in Figure 2, the survey includes Likert scale 
questions and scenarios.  The Likert scale is used to evaluate attitudinal questions of 
prioritization and confidence.  The use of scenarios has been used in many disciplines, including 
military strategy, marketing, economy, and decision making (Leite, Hadad, Doorn, and Kaplan, 
2000).  Scenarios have been shown to be effective methods of evaluation due to their ability to 
stimulate thinking (Leite et al., 2000).  The scenarios used will be based on possible real-life 
situations and will include both indoor releases of anthrax and outdoor releases.  These scenarios 
will evaluate participants’ confidence in reacting to the situation, and their decontamination and 
evacuation techniques. This can then be modeled to check if the respondents answers will assure 
safety and protection for all who may be exposed. 
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Figure 2.  Influence diagram showing decisions involved in B. anthracis response.  
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In order to evaluate the scenario questions, past modeling studies and current modeling 
work will be evaluated.  Modeling and simulation of chemical and biological agent releases has 
been used extensively in response applications (Jain and McLean, 2003).  Additionally, 
emergency response personnel often use the results of such modeling to develop training and 
action plans for real-life scenarios (Jain and McLean, 2003).  While current modeling systems 
are able to capture many aspects of a disaster (i.e. evacuation, deposition and transport, medical 
response, etc.), the modeling in this study mainly looks at a single dispersion event (one for an 
indoor release and one for an outdoor release).  
Contribution to First Responders and the Public 
 This study increases the safety of first responders and the public in the event of a 
bioterrorism attack.  Through the evaluation of our results, training programs for first responders 
can be improved.  This will not only ensure that the first responders are protected from the 
threats posed by biological warfare, but will also safeguard the public that relies on first 
responders to properly manage incidents. 
Factors not Addressed in this Study 
 This research focuses on inhalation risk of aerosolized B. anthracis only, and does not 
consider ingestion or cutaneous forms.  The inhalation pathway was selected due to the high 
fatality risk, which historically ranged from 89 to 96% in untreated (Hong et al., 2010; Holty et 
al.,2006; Swanson and Fosnocht, 1999).  During the modeling phase of this study, which will be 
used to assess the accuracy of first responders’ evacuation and decontamination knowledge 
based on fictitious scenarios, uniform mixing will be assumed in indoor areas.  This assumption 
may neglect high risk localized areas, such as areas where a letter was first opened, but will be 
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appropriate for areas removed in time and space from the release (i.e. a different room or 
building) (Hong et al., 2010).    The modeling of an outdoor release will not include the 
influences of buildings, traffic, or other factors that would interfere with dispersion.  
Additionally, this study will not compare the perceived capability of participants with their actual 
performance during a threat or mock event. 
SPECIFIC AIMS 
 First Responders Knowledge and Training Needs for Bioterrorism has 4 specific aims: 
1) Determine the current training practices for bioterrorism incidents; 
2) Investigate the differences in training programs on the basis of geography and 
organization; 
3) Identify gaps in knowledge; 
4) Develop recommendations for a protocol for a universal training program; 
The determination of current training practices includes identification of who administers the 
training, where it takes place, how long it takes, and what the contents include.  The investigation 
of differences in training programs assesses variations in training based on 1) geography: urban 
(with specific groups in high-threat areas of New York City and Washington, D.C.), suburban, 
and rural areas; 2) organizational level: local, state, or federal; and 3) organization type: Fire, 
Police, Health Department, and/or Hazardous Materials (Hazmat) Response Unit.  Identification 
of knowledge gaps focuses on selection of personal protective equipment, cordoning off areas, 
evacuation, and decontamination.  The development of recommendations for a training program 
protocol is based on both participants’ beliefs in what should be included and an evaluation of 
knowledge gaps. 
12 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
Overview of Study Design 
 First Responders Knowledge and Training Needs is a descriptive study utilizing 
interviews and surveys.  The study design used in this project is a questionnaire containing a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative questions.   Surveys are often used as a measurement 
of quality, and in this research are used to measure the perceived quality of training programs 
(Allen and Seaman, 2007). 
Subjects 
 The subjects in this study include first responders in the United States.  In order to be 
included in the study, participants must currently be, or in the past have been, first responders.  
The Department of Homeland Security defines a first responder as 
individuals who in the early stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and 
preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency 
response providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 101), as well as emergency management, public health, clinical care, public 
works, and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide 
immediate support services during prevention, response, and recovery operation (DHS, 
2009).   
This study includes members of police forces and fire departments, both volunteer and paid, the 
health department, and HAZMAT teams.  Both males and females were included.  An attempt 
was made to represent various geographical areas within the United States, including participants 
from urban and suburban areas. 
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Sample size and justification 
 The study enrolled 70 participants.  This number allows the study enough statistical 
power to make significant comparisons and conclusions.  IRB approval was granted for 100 
participants.  While a larger sample size would further increase the power, it was unfeasible for 
the time and funding constraints on the project.  
Recruitment and enrollment procedure 
 Subjects were recruited by a number of means.  Surveys were distributed at a national 
conference (Fire Rescue EAST in Daytona Beach, Florida January 20 and 21, 2011) and through 
personal, professional, and local networking.   Publically available contact information on state 
and agency websites was also used to recruit participants.  Potential subjects not present at the 
conference were contacted via e-mail, phone, or personal interaction.  Incentives have been 
shown to have a significant positive effect on response rate, so this study offered compensation 
in the form of gift cards (Church, 1993).  A $20.00 Amazon.com or Starbucks gift cards were 
offered as compensation for completion of the survey.  
Data Collection Methods and Procedures 
The survey was designed to take approximately 20 minutes.  This provided an adequate 
amount of time to complete the survey and gather all the data needed for analysis and still 
accommodated the busy schedules of first responders.  The survey was designed using language 
familiar to the first responder community, including terms used in the National Incitement 
Management System emergency response protocols.  Several first responders, regional 
preparedness experts, and personnel from government agencies, including the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Health and Human Services 
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(HHS) were involved in the development and pre-testing of the survey.  The survey was given 
in-person and mailed to fire departments.  Due to the complexity of the scenario questions, the 
majority of surveys (n=52) were administered orally.  18 surveys were returned via the U.S. 
Postal Service, with a mailed survey response rate of 30%. 
Many of the questions in the survey instrument use a Likert scale, ranging from 1 to 5.   
Likert scales have been used widely to measure attitudes and opinions (Gob, McCollin, and 
Ramalhoto, 2007). Five response categories is the minimum recommended number of categories, 
and this survey utilizes five (Allen and Seaman, 2007).   The attitude and perception response 
ratings included: 1= “strongly disagree,” 2= “disagree,” 3= “neutral/no opinion,” 4= “agree,” and 
5= “strongly agree.”  This scale is similar to the one used to assess perception of first responders 
in a related study (Abatemarco et al., 2007). 
 Scenarios have been shown to be effective methods of evaluation due to their ability to 
stimulate thinking (Leite et al., 2000).  The first scenario developed for use in the survey are 
modeled after those used by Hong, Gurian and Ward (2010) to determine risk-informed 
concentration standards for B. anthracis and by the National Institutes of Technology (NIST).   
This scenario models a hypothetical office with a simple heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning (HVAC) system.  The second, an outdoor release of anthrax, uses parameters 
similar to those found in the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) model 
(Davis and Bennett, 2004).  
 The survey was pilot tested with individuals from the first responder community.  This 
helped identify any questionnaire problems (ASA, 1997).  Pilot testing also ensured that the 
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questions were understandable and addressed any problems with formatting that may have 
caused participants to skip questions or become confused (ASA, 1997). 
Data management and file development activities. Data was entered manually into 
Microsoft Excel and SPSS Statistical Package, Version 19.  Files were saved to a hard drive and 
back up externally once a week.  Coding systems were used to define variables for data entry 
into SPSS.  Checks were made after data entry to ensure the correct data has been entered into 
the system. 
Analysis Plan 
In order to analyze the data collected from the survey, a number of statistical calculations 
were performed.  Data were entered into Microsoft Excel and SPSS Version 19.  Means, 
frequencies, correlations, regression, and cross-tabs were calculated.  The statistical operations 
used to achieve each project aim are outlined in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Statistics and analyses used to understand and reach aims of study 
 
 There is no common standard for the analysis of Likert scale data (Gob et al., 2007); 
however mean and standard deviation are often invalid parameters when analyzing ordinal scales 
such as Likert scales (Allen and Seaman, 2007).  Because of this, tabulations, frequencies, 
contingency tables, and chi-square statistics were calculated.  Means were also calculated for 
other questions that were ordinal in scale.   This process is similar to the groupings that were 
done in the study of first responders by Abatemarco et al., 2007. 
Modeling scenarios. 
Indoor Scenario Modeling.  Modeling studies have been performed to estimate the effects 
of anthrax releases indoors.  Reshetin and Regens (2003) numerically modeled the intentional 
release and subsequent dispersion of anthrax spores in a typical 50-story, high-rise building. 
Aim Analysis 
Determine current training 
practices for bioterrorism 
incidents 
Calculate means for questions asking about training in specific 
areas of response; use logistic regression to determine why there 
may be differences; ANOVA and contingency tables/chi-square 
tests to assess relationship between training and location, 
organization, and other categorical variables  
Investigate differences in 
training programs on the 
basis of geography and 
organization 
Use logistic regression and cross-tabs to determine what 
influences competencies 
Identify gaps in knowledge 
Calculate means for questions asking about confidence; evaluate 
number of correct responses for questions that are included as a 
"check”  
Develop recommendations 
for a protocol for a universal 
training program 
Combine results of previous analyses to determine where gaps in 
knowledge are, why they occur, and what first responders think 
should be a priority for training; Compare this to current training 
recommendations and procedures 
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Their model predicts the time required for spores to disperse throughout a building. Results of 
the analysis show that even with a small release, infectious concentrations of spores quickly 
disperse throughout the building. Webb and Blaser (2002) mathematically modeled transmission 
of inhalational anthrax via the postal system by cross-contaminated mail. The model used state 
vectors to consider the generation of cross-contaminated letters, the numbers of anthrax spores 
on the letters, and the numbers of infections that would result in recipients. It created a general 
framework to investigate potential impacts of future outbreaks. Ho and Duncan (2005) used 
simulated anthrax spores to describe the biological aerosols created by manipulating letters 
contaminated with spores, as well as the dispersion of those spores when the letter was processed 
by a mail sorter. The results were used to estimate aerosol dosages that result from spore 
contaminated letters. Hong et al. (2010) discuss the need to use environmental concentrations of 
B. anthracis to infer past or future aerosol exposures in an indoor environment given the rapid 
decline in air concentrations immediately after a release. Their model relates concentrations of 
spores on walls and floors, in ventilation system filters, and in human nasal passages to human 
health risk. Given the large numbers of assumptions that need to be made, they conclude that 
there are large uncertainties associated with the calculated risk.  
Outdoor Scenario Modeling.  The second scenario included in the survey was an outdoor 
release at Love Park in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania where anthrax was sprayed from someone 
posing as a landscaper. There have been a number of studies which have attempted to quantify 
the impact of a large-scale release of anthrax (WHO 1970; OTA 1993; Wein et al. 2003; 
Isukapalli et al., 2008), which can be used to compare participants’ responses to the scenario 
questions.  In addition to using these past studies, we performed a risk assessment analysis. 
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The risk assessment regarding the outdoor scenario was performed to determine the 
extent of contamination from an outdoor release in Love Park.  The base case for this scenario 
was assumed to be a release of 1 gram of anthrax at Love Park on a day when the prevailing 
wind was from the west. It was assumed that the release occurred at a height of 2.4 m above the 
ground surface, and the concentration was measured at a height between 1.2 and 1.7 m above the 
ground surface. Wind speed was estimated to be 4 m/s, which represented a “neutral” 
meteorological condition. In determining dose, the average dose response parameter discussed in 
Hong et al. (2010) was used. 
The release was assumed to be instantaneous, so a Gaussian puff equation was used to 
model transport and dispersion of the spores after release (Long et al. 2006).  The model was 
used to calculate the concentration profile with time after release.  The puff model is defined by 
the following equation: 
 
where 
Cr      = concentration at receptor, spores/m3  
xr, yr, zr    = Cartesian coordinates downwind of the puff, m 
Q      = emission rate, spores 
t     = time since release, s 
U      = wind speed, m/s 
He         = height of puff centerline, m 
σx, σy, σz = standard deviations of the concentration distribution x-, y-, z-directions, m 
 
The following assumptions were made in utilizing the Gaussian puff model: 
1. The dispersion coefficients in the x- and y-directions were assumed to be the same. 
2. The wind was assumed to be a uniform speed parallel to the x-direction.   
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3. The spore concentration was calculated in a cube with dimensions of 1m x 1m x 0.5m at 
a height between 3.8 and 5.4 feet above the ground surface. 
4. The anthrax was released at a height of 8 feet above the ground surface. 
Details of the parameters used in the base case are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Model inputs for outdoor scenario. 
 
 
 
The resulting concentration profile was used to calculate the inhalation dose according to the 
following equation: 
 Dose = inhalation rate*concentration/volume 
As shown in Table 3, a constant inhalation rate of 3.33 x 10-4 m3/s (Hong et al. 2010) was 
used for the base case. In applying this equation, it was assumed that the inhalation rate was 
CONSTANTS
Q (spores)
U (m/sec)
He (m)
Solar Radiation
Inhalation rate:
R value
Stability Class
Dispersion Parameters for Instantaneous Releases
σy Unstable
Neutral
Very stable
σz Unstable
Neutral
Very stable
Source for dispersion parameters:  Islitzer and Slade 1968.
0.05x0.61
1.3E12 (1.3E11, 1.3E13)
4 (2, 6.7)
Base (variations)
7.43E-6 (9.10E-7, 7.10E-5)
C (A, G)
0.14x0.92
0.06x0.92
0.02x0.89
0.53x0.73
0.15x0.70
MODEL INPUTS
2.4384
2.21
3.33E-4 m3/sec
Time Step (seconds) 300
Dispersion Parameter Stability
Exposure Time (seconds) 1800
Source Height (m) 2.4384
Inhalation Height Range (m) 1.17 - 1.67
Equation                         
(x in meters)
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constant and that anthrax dose is from inhalation only. Other exposure pathways such as dermal 
and ingestion exposure were considered to be negligible compared to inhalation.  
To determine risk, the exponential dose response equation was used: 
Risk = 1 – e-r(dose) 
where r = dose response coefficient specific to B. anthracis. For the base case, a dose response 
coefficient of 7.43 x10-6 was used (Hong et al. 2010). Uniform population characteristics, 
including age distribution and susceptibility to infection, were assumed in applying this equation.  
The following parameters were varied in the sensitivity analysis: amount of anthrax released; 
dose response parameter; wind direction; acceptable risk; meteorological stability class; and, 
time of release (day vs. night). The results of the sensitivity analysis are discussed in the results 
section.  
RESULTS 
 A total of 70 first responders participated in this research study.   Table 3 shows the 
organizational breakdown of the participants. Of the 70 first responders involved in this study, 55 
were from the fire department, 1 was from the police department, 2 represented the health 
department, 5 were Hazmat technicians and 7 fell in the “other category” which included 
combination of organizations and other first responder personnel such as emergency medical 
technicians (EMTs).  50 study participants represented local departments, 12 were state-level 
first responders, 3 were from federal agencies, and 5 were included as “other.”  Regarding 
location, 29 of the participants were from urban areas, 18 were from suburban regions, and 22 
were located in rural areas of the United States. 
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Table 3. Survey participants’ organizational information. 
Organization 
Fire 55 
Police 1 
Health Department 2 
Hazmat 5 
Other 7 
Total 70 
Organizational Level 
Local 50 
State 23 
Federal 3 
Other 6 
Total 70 
Location 
Urban 29 
Suburban 18 
Rural 22 
Total 69 
 
 Table 4 gives the summary of participants’ training levels, locations, and providers.  
Additionally, it gives the breakdown of the percentage of participants who have been trained in 
specific areas.  Of the 69 first responders who answered what level training they had regarding 
bioterrorism, 12 (17.4%) had not received any training.  29% of participants had received 
awareness level training, which FEMA defines as “designed for responders who require the skills 
necessary to recognize and report a potential catastrophic incident or who are likely to wises or 
investigate an event involving the use of hazardous and/or explosive devices” (NTED, 2011). 
10% of participants had received performance level training, which is “designed for first 
responders who perform tasks during the initial response to a catastrophic event, such as 
safeguarding the at-risk public, rescuing victims, or decontaminating victims” (NTED, 2011), 
and 3% had received management and planning level training, which is “designed for managers 
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who build plans and coordinate the response to a mass consequence manmade or natural event 
(NTED, 2011).  22% had been trained in Hazmat response, and 19% had a combination of 
different training levels.  Note that the definition of “Hazmat training” varies, and there are 
different levels of training, including awareness, materials operation, and technical training 
(IAFF). 
 The location of where the first responder participants had been trained and the training 
provider varied.  39% were trained in-residence at their facility, 27% were trained at a location 
other than their facility, such as a national or regional training center, 12% completed their 
training on-line, and 22% had been trained at more than one of the location choices.  When 
“other” responses included a combination with “on-line,” this raised the total amount of 
participants who had been trained using at least on-line training to 24%.   45% of participants 
were trained by personnel from their facility, such as a chief.  22.6% of participants received 
their training from someone in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for example someone 
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  6.5% of participants were trained 
by someone from the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), and 1 participant 
was trained by someone from the National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety 
(NIOSH).  12.8% of participants had training from a combination of providers, and 11.3% 
received training from someone not mentioned on our list of choices. 
The survey asked about training in specific areas, including 1)  who to notify in the event 
of a white powder event, 2) what areas to cordon off in the event of a white powder event, 3) 
how to perform personal decontamination, 4) how to use hand-held, on-site testing devices, 5) 
how to handle an indoor release of anthrax such as the situation presented in the first scenario, 
and 6) how to handle an outdoor release of anthrax such as the situation presented in the second 
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scenario.  Over half of the participants had been trained regarding notification (67.3%), 
cordoning off areas (61.8%), and personal decontamination (70.9%).  Less than half were rained 
regarding hand-held, on-site testing devices (34.5%), and how to respond to the indoor (41.8%) 
and outdoor (32.7%) release scenarios. 
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Table 4. Survey participants’ training information.   
  Number  Percent 
What level training have you received? 
Awareness Level 20 29.0% 
Performance Level 7 10.1% 
Management and Planning Level 2 2.9% 
HAZMAT  15 21.7% 
Combination 13 18.9% 
No Training 12 17.4% 
Total 69 100.0% 
Where did you receive training? 
In-residence, at my facility 23 39.0% 
A location other than my facility 16 27.1% 
On-line 7 11.9% 
Combination 13 22.0% 
Total 59 100.0% 
Who provided the training? 
Someone from my facility 28 45.2% 
Someone from DHS 14 22.6% 
Someone from OSHA 4 6.5% 
Someone from NIOSH 1 1.6% 
Combination 8 12.8% 
Other 7 11.3% 
Total 58 100.0% 
General training topics 
  Yes   n(%) No  n(%) 
I have been trained about who to notify in the 
event of a white powder event. 37 (67.3%) 18 (32.7%) 
I have been trained on what areas to cordon off in 
the event of a white powder event. 34 (61.8%) 21 (38.2%) 
I have been trained on how to perform personal 
decontamination. 39 (70.9%) 16 (29.1%) 
I have been trained on how to use hand-held, on-
site testing devices. 19 (34.5%) 36 (65.5%) 
I have been trained on how to handle an indoor 
release of anthrax*. 23 (41.8%) 32 (58.2%) 
I have been trained on how to handle an outdoor 
release of anthrax*. 18 (32.7%) 37 (67.3%)  
*These questions referred to scenarios presented in the survey, not indoor and outdoor releases 
in general. 
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 In order to evaluate the differences between who is in charge of certain efforts of a white 
powder response, participants responded to questions asking who is in charge of 1) sample 
collection, 2) on-scene testing, 3) cordoning off, 4) evacuation, and 5) decontamination. 
Participants then chose the department they believed should be in charge of each response effort 
(Table 5).  There were slight variations (less than a 5 person change) between who is in charge 
and who should be in charge for all of the response efforts.  Regarding sample collection, nearly 
half (48.5%) of participants responded that the fire department is in charge, and 43.1% believed 
they should be in charge.  10% responded that the police department currently handles sample 
collection, 15.7% chose the health department, and 4.3% said sample collection is handled by 
whoever is on the scene first.  Responses followed a similar pattern for on-scene testing, 
cordoning off, and evacuation, with the majority of respondents selecting the fire department as 
who is currently in charge and who should be in charge.  For on-scene testing, the next highest 
selection was the health department, with 21.7% stating they are currently in charge and 26.1% 
believing they should be in charge.  The fire department was chosen by over half of participants 
(66.7%) as being responsible for personal decontamination, the only response element to have 
over 50% of responses in agreement. 
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Table 5. Responses regarding who is in charge of different pieces of the response and who 
should be in charge of each response effort. 
  In Charge Should be In Charge 
  # % # % 
Sample Collection 
Fire Department 32 48.5% 28 43.1% 
Police Department 7 10% 6 9.2% 
Health Department 11 15.7% 15 23.1% 
Whoever is first on the scene 3 4.3% 1 1.5% 
Other 11 15.7% 14 21.5% 
Total 66 100.0% 65 100.0% 
On-scene Testing 
Fire Department 28 40.6% 28 40.6% 
Police Department 3 4.3% 3 4.3% 
Health Department 15 21.7% 18 26.1% 
Whoever is first on the scene 6 8.7% 3 4.3% 
Other 15 21.4% 17 24.6% 
Total 69 100.0% 69 100.0% 
Cordoning off   
Fire Department 28 40.6% 28 40.6% 
Police Department 15 21.7% 12 17.4% 
Health Department 2 2.9% 5 7.2% 
Whoever is first on the scene 15 21.7% 12 17.4% 
Other 9 13.1% 12 17.4% 
Total 69 100.0% 69 100.0% 
Evacuation   
Fire Department 32 45.7% 31 44.9% 
Police Department 22 31.4% 17 24.6% 
Health Department 2 2.9% 7 10.1% 
Whoever is first on the scene 5 7.1% 3 4.3% 
Other 8 11.3% 11 15.8% 
Total 69 100.0% 69 100.0% 
Decontamination   
Fire Department 46 66.7% 43 62.3% 
Police Department 1 1.4% 2 2.9% 
Health Department 7 10.1% 11 15.9% 
Whoever is first on the scene 4 5.8% 2 2.9% 
Other 11 15.7% 11 15.7% 
Total 69 100.0% 69 100.0% 
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 In order to determine if the responses generated for questions regarding who is and who 
should be in charge of response elements were a function of bias, cross-tabulations were 
performed to examine differences between fire department and non-fire department responses.  
The main differences included:  
- In non-fire department responses, the health department received higher overall 
responses, especially for “who should be in charge of sample collection” (27% of fire 
department participants chose the health department while 44.5% of non-fire department 
participants chose health department) 
- 47% of fire department participants think they should be in charge of on-scene testing, 
while 65% of non-fire department participants think the fire department should be in 
charge.  40% of fire department participants think health department should be in charge, 
while only 27% of non-fire department participants think health department should be in 
charge. 
- 29% of fire department participants think the police should be in charge of cordoning off 
areas, while 0% of non-fire department participants think the police should be. 27.3% of 
non-fire department participants think health department should be in charge of 
cordoning off areas, while only 5% of fire department participants think health 
department should be in charge. 
These differences could just be an effect of small sample size of non-fire department participants 
or different protocols for different areas and may not necessarily represent a disconnect between 
groups in a geographic location that would need to work together during a response. 
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 The survey also asked first responders what level of PPE they would wear when 
responding to an indoor white powder incident and an outdoor white powder incident (Table 6).  
According to OSHA (1993), Level A is required when the “greatest level of skin, respiratory, 
and eye protection is required.”  It consists of 1) a positive pressure, full face-piece self-
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or positive pressure supplied air respirator with escape 
SCBA, 2) a total-encapsulating chemical-protective suit, 3) inner and outer chemical-resistant 
gloves, 4) chemical resistant boots, and 5) disposable protective suit, gloves, and boots.  Level B 
provides the highest level of respiratory protection but a lesser level of skin protection, and it 
consists of 1) a positive pressure, full face-piece SCBA or positive pressure supplied air 
respirator with escape SCBA, 2) hooded chemical-resistant clothing, 3) inner and outer 
chemical-resistant gloves, and 4) chemical resistant boots (OSHA, 1993).   Level C is 
recommended when responders know concentrations and types of airborne substances and 
require air purifying respirators.  The equipment for Level C consists of 1) a full-face or half-
mask, air purifying respirator, 2) hooded chemical-resistant clothing, and 3) inner and outer 
chemical resistant gloves (OSHA, 1993).  Level D is a standard work uniform which is used for 
“nuisance contamination only” (OSHA, 1993).  For an indoor incident, the majority (39.7%) 
would wear Level A, 25% would wear Level B, 8.8% would wear level C, 2.9% would wear 
Level D, and 23.5% would remain outside until a certified team is notified.  The majority of 
participants (34.3%) responded that they would wear Level B to an outdoor  white powder event, 
29.4% would wear Level A, 8.6% would wear Level D, and 22.9% would remain outside the 
affected area until a certified team is notified. 
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Table 6. Level of Personal Protective Equipment used for Indoor and Outdoor B. anthracis 
Response. 
  # % 
Indoor White Powder Incident 
Level A 27 39.7% 
Level B 17 25.0% 
Level C 6 8.8% 
Level D 2 2.9% 
Remain outside 
until certified 
team is notified 16 23.5.0% 
Total 68 100.0% 
Outdoor White Powder Incident 
Level A 20 29.4% 
Level B 24 34.3% 
Level C 6 8.6% 
Level D 2 2.9% 
Remain outside 
until certified 
team is notified 16 22.9% 
Total 68 100.0% 
 
 
 Thirteen questions on the survey were used to assess attitudes and perceptions regarding 
bioterrorism attacks, preparedness, training needs, and confidence.  Means were calculated from 
Likert scale responses ranging from 1 to 5 (Table 7).   The mean responses are also shown 
graphically in Figure 3.  The lowest confidence was found for hand-held, on-site testing device 
use and responding to an outdoor release as described in the second scenario.  
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Table 7. Responses to Likert scale questions, with mean and 95% confidence intervals. 
Q 
# Question 
Mean (95% 
CI) n 
15 
I believe anthrax is a major threat to the 
population our department serves. 
 3.22 (2.90, 
3.71)  70 
16 
Our department is prepared to handle a white 
powder threat or incident 
 3.23 (2.97, 
3.88)  70 
17 
It is a priority that our department offer more 
training in regards to anthrax and bioterrorism 
threats/attacks. 
 3.68 (3.45, 
4.00) 69 
19 
I am confident in my decisions on notifying 
the correct groups (i.e. FBI, public health 
department, etc.) in the event of a white 
powder event. 
 3.88(3.57, 
4.24)  64 
20 
It is a priority that there be additional training 
regarding notification. 
 3.80 (3.30, 
4.23)  66 
22 
I am confident in my decisions of which areas 
should be cordoned off. 
 3.63 (3.47, 
4.17) 64 
23 
It is a priority that there be additional training 
regarding cordoning off areas. 
 3.84 (3.35, 
4.12)  68 
25 
I am confident in my ability to perform 
personal decontamination. 
 3.73 (3.31, 
4.43)  63 
27 
It is a priority that there be additional training 
regarding personal decontamination. 
 3.89 (3.59, 
4.16)  65 
29 
I am confident in my ability to use hand-held, 
on-site testing devices. 
 2.74 (2.26, 
3.70)  58 
30 
It is important to be able to perform on-scene 
testing, and it should be a priority to have more 
training related to using them. 
 3.86 (3.48, 
4.17)  64 
32 
How comfortable are you with the training 
you've received regarding the type of scenario 
involving an indoor release of anthrax? 
3.35 (2.94, 
3.90)  52 
33 
How comfortable are you with the training 
you've received regarding the type of scenario 
involving an outdoor release of anthrax? 
 2.58 (2.07, 
3.06)  52 
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Figure 3. Mean responses and 95% confidence intervals for attitude and perception questions.
 
 
Cross-tabulations were calculated to determine differences between confidence and attitude 
questions and categorical variables (organization type, organizational level, training location, 
training provider, geographical location, and highest training level completed).  The small 
sample size for some of the groups may have made statistical significance difficult to achieve, 
but differences were observed between confidence and comfort questions.  Hazmat personnel 
participants had the highest confidence in on-site testing (3.4), while police (2.0) and fire 
department (2.6) personnel had the lowest confidence.  The health department participants had 
the lowest comfort level with responding to the indoor scenario (2.5), while Hazmat personnel 
participants had the highest comfort level (4.0).  Federal agency participants rated “anthrax is a 
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major threat” the lowest (2.5), while participants with local organizations rated this highest (3.3).  
Participants from a state-level department had the lowest rating for how prepared their 
department is (2.8), while local departments rated this highest (3.3). 
Despite the small sample size for some groups, some statistically significant results (p< 0.05) 
were observed.  Participants from Washington D.C. believed anthrax to be a major threat more 
than participants from other locations (p=.044) and also believed their department was more 
prepared to handle responding to an anthrax attack (p=0.049).  Those who had 
management/planning level training believed anthrax to be a major threat more than participants 
who had lower-levels of training (p=0.019).  Participants with the most confidence in 
decontamination decisions had been trained to the performance level (p=0.046).  Participants 
from local organizations also rated priorities for additional training in notification (p=0.005) and 
on-site testing (p=0.028) as the highest. 
Personal Protective Equipment 
 For both the indoor white power incident scenario and the outdoor release scenario, 
participants were asked where they would put on their PPE.  For the indoor scenario (n=59), 40 
stated that they would put on their equipment outside of the building, which many specified as 
the cold zone.  9 participants would put on their PPE before arriving at the scene, either while at 
the station or while on the vehicle en route to the incident.  4 participants said they would put on 
their PPE on inside the building where the release went off, which was specified as the cold zone 
lobby area (n=3) or the warm zone (n=1).  The remaining 6 participants who answered this 
question did not give a response that was able to determine whether the equipment would be put 
on inside or outside of the building. 
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 56 participants responded to the outdoor scenario PPE question: 19 participants 
responded that they would put on PPE “upwind” of the release; 11 stated that they would put on 
their equipment before arriving on-scene, either on the vehicle or at the station; 13 specified that 
they would put on their PPE in the “cold zone,” which included both “upwind” responses and 
areas that were downwind; 2 would put on their equipment in the parking lot or approximately a 
block away;  and 3 stated they would put on their equipment in the warm zone .  The remaining 
participants did not give specific enough answers to evaluate. 
 Decontamination.  Participants were asked about decontamination in the first scenario 
(for occupants in the building where there was an indoor release of anthrax). When asked if 
occupants of the room where the envelope was opened needed decontamination, 97% said yes 
(n=66).  80% of participants (n=64) thought occupants of the floor where the enveloped was 
opened needed decontamination.  Less than half of the participants (42%, n=66) thought that 
occupants of the entire building needed decontamination.  10 participants identified setting up 
decontamination stations somewhere inside the decontaminated building, 27 would set up 
decontamination stations outside or in a nearby building, and 11 gave answers that could not be 
identifiable. 
Qualitative Responses 
 30 total participants responded when asked an open-ended question regarding a specific 
aspect they would like more training on. 12 responded that they did not want any training of 
specific aspects of bioterrorism, 11 wanted more general training about bioterrorism or more 
frequent refresher courses, 2 wanted training regarding how to identify anthrax, 2 wanted 
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training for on-site testing, 2 were interested in Incident Command System training, and 1 
participant identified training in evacuation and decontamination as a need. 
Modeling and Scenario Responses 
Indoor Scenario. Based on modeling indoor risk by Hong et al. (2010), we have 
approximated that people in the room where the anthrax was released is three times higher than 
in the next room.   Additionally, we consider the results of Reshetin and Regens (2003), which 
demonstrates that the entire building will be contaminated with anthrax spores in a short time 
period.  Participants coded the indoor release scenario diagram by establishing zones.  According 
to the IAFF, these zones include: 
Hot Zone - The area in which the hazardous material is actually located. It is 
the area of maximum hazard and is restricted to essential personnel using 
appropriate protective clothing and equipment. Access to this area is tightly 
controlled at a single entry point, and no one is allowed to enter this zone for 
any reason without a “buddy.” Also, prior to entry, a backup team with the 
same number of members as the entry team must be standing by. Time within 
the hot zone must be minimized through careful planning and monitoring. The 
entry team must have communication devices and alternate plans for 
communication if radios do not function. There must be an emergency recall 
system in case it becomes necessary to rapidly evacuate the area. 
 
Warm Zone - The warm zone (also called the transition zone or the 
contamination reduction zone) is a transition area between the 
hot zone and the cold zone (clean area). This area, located away 
from the hazard, helps prevent contaminants from spreading to 
unaffected areas. Decontamination takes place in the warm 
zone, and personnel must use protective equipment appropriate 
to the level of hazard. The line that separates the hot zone from 
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the warm zone is the hot line, and this may be marked with 
barrier tape. 
 
Cold Zone - The cold zone is the area beyond the range of potential 
contamination. The public is excluded from this area to allow the fire 
department and other emergency response agencies to function. The command 
post, treatment area for decontaminated patients, and rehabilitation area for 
emergency response personnel are established in the cold zone. 
30% of participants who coded the diagram of the indoor release scenario (n=42) chose the entire 
building as the hot zone.  35% of these participants chose parts of the building, either the lobby 
area or floors above the release, as the cold zone.   
Outdoor Scenario. Using the Gaussian puff model and risk equations (described in 
Methods), the risk of infection from anthrax was calculated for areas in Philadelphia.  As shown 
in Figure 4, the meteorological conditions greatly impact how far the risks extend from the initial 
release point.  In an unstable atmosphere, the risk drops to 0 in less than a mile from the release.  
The risks of infection remain above 0 until approximately 2 miles, and a stable atmosphere still 
results in a risk of 20% 5 miles from the release (Figures 7, 8, and 9 show these risks on a GIS-
produced map.)  Figure 5 shows how different amounts of anthrax released would affect the 
distance of infection risks.  Figure 6 shows how risks vary with distance for different dose-
response coefficients (r-value). 
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Figure 4. Risk of infection vs. distance for different meteorological stability classes. 
 
Figure 5. Risk of infection vs. distance for different release amounts. 
 
 
Figure 6. Risk vs. distance for different dose-response coefficients (r-value).
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Figure 7. GIS map showing risk of scenario during unstable atmospheric conditions. 
 
Figure 8. GIS map showing risk of scenario during neutral atmospheric conditions. 
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Figure 9. GIS map showing risk of scenario during stable atmospheric conditions. 
 
 Participants were asked to code the outdoor scenario map with zones, including the hot 
zone, warm zone, and cold zone.  Only 30 of the 70 participants coded this map in a manner that 
could be analyzed.  Of these, 67% indicated awareness of a plume, by drawing the zones 
downwind.   As demonstrated by the modeling results (Figures 7 through 9), the downward 
plume of anthrax risks extends into New Jersey in all three meteorological conditions.  The 
transfer of anthrax perpendicular to the wind is between 1 and 12 orders of magnitudes less than 
downwind transfer.  Participants, however, did not note this major difference when coding the 
map.  33% coded a 1:1 ratio of the area where anthrax dispersed (i.e. a circle around the release 
area), 27% coded a 2:1 ratio (i.e. the anthrax traveled twice as far downwind as it did parallel to 
wind direction), 10% coded a 3:1 ratio, 10% coded a 4:1 ratio, 3% coded a 5:1 ratio, 7% coded a 
6:1 ratio, and 10% coded a 10:1 ratio, which just hit the lower bound of the modeled range. 
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DISCUSSION 
 Developing emergency response training is often challenging due to the diversity of first 
responders and number of organizations involved.  As a NIST workshop report points out: 
Of the total of approximately one million firefighters in the nation, 75% are volunteers. Most 
of the volunteer firefighters are based in rural areas. In metropolitan areas, firefighters are 
mostly professionals. The responsibilities of the different organizations overlap and 
sometimes are not clearly defined. For example, local police, local fire department and 
emergency medical service (EMS) are responsible for initial response while the role of the 
FBI for this function is not clearly defined for this function (NIST, 2003). 
This paper, however, has reached some key conclusions which can be applied when developing 
or initiating a bioterrorism training protocol, some of which can be aimed toward specific sectors 
of the first responder community. 
Charge of Response Elements. Generally, participants believed in the structure that was 
in place for their geographic area, region, and department.  The largest disconnect was between 
who should be in charge of on-scene testing.  If on-scene testing is implemented as a response 
protocol, guidelines need to be in place for who is responsible for the testing.  The differences in 
opinion of charge that were present when calculating fire department versus non-fire department 
responses could just be an effect of small sample size of non-firemen or different protocols for 
different areas and may not necessarily represent a disconnect between groups in a geographic 
location that would need to work together during a response. 
Scenarios. Much of the current modeling literature on anthrax releases indoors suggest 
that entire buildings will be contaminated in short amounts of time after an initial release.  
Reshetin and Regens (2003) numerically modeled the intentional release and subsequent 
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dispersion of anthrax spores in a typical 50-story, high-rise building. Their model predicts the 
time required for spores to disperse throughout a building. Results of the analysis show that even 
with a small release, infectious concentrations of spores quickly disperse throughout the 
building.  Hong et al. (2010) discuss the need to use environmental concentrations of B. 
anthracis to infer past or future aerosol exposures in an indoor environment given the rapid 
decline in air concentrations immediately after a release. Their model relates concentrations of 
spores on walls and floors, in ventilation system filters, and in human nasal passages to human 
health risk. Given the large numbers of assumptions that need to be made, they conclude that 
there are large uncertainties associated with the calculated risk; however, anthrax spores easily 
spread throughout an entire building.   
The 2001 anthrax attacks highlighted a need to address decontamination decisions. Hong 
et al. (2010) found that larger areas would be “subject to antibiotic treatment of exposed 
individuals than environmental decontamination” in the 2001 attacks.  This study identified a 
similar need to address decontamination in a building. Overall, participants in this study stated 
that they were confident in their decisions regarding decontamination; however we found that 
many of their decisions regarding the indoor scenario would still place themselves or occupants 
at risk.  Generally, first responders were not aware of the ability for anthrax to spread quickly 
throughout an entire building.   Only 30% (n=42) of participants coded the entire building as a 
hot zone, and only 42% of participants thought that occupants of the entire building required 
decontamination.  While this could be due to interpretation differences (i.e., some may have 
thought that occupants could decontaminate at home and therefore selected “no”), this still points 
to a major knowledge gap.  2 participants did not think that occupants of the room where the 
anthrax was released needed decontamination, and 20% of participants did not think that 
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occupants of the floor where the anthrax was released required decontamination. Additionally, 
21% (n=48) of participants identified setting up decontamination stations somewhere inside the 
decontaminated building. A major knowledge gap appears to exist as to the risks in a building 
where anthrax is released, as many underestimate the ability for anthrax spores to spread 
throughout a building, even with separate HVAC systems. 
For outdoor releases of anthrax, the modeling performed in this study find similar results 
as the literature (Isukapalli et al., 2008, Wein et al., 2003).  Based on the survey results, weak 
evidence exists that participants underestimated the risk downwind and overestimated how far it 
transfers perpendicular to the wind.  This finding, however, could be an effect of the map we 
provided in the survey.  The map was approximately a 1:3 ratio, and did not extend into New 
Jersey.  This bias would not affect the result that approximately one third of participants were not 
aware of downwind dispersion plumes.  
Hand-held, on-site testing. Questions regarding the use of hand-held, on-site testing 
devices showed that first responders are generally not confident in their ability to use them.  
Additionally, over half (65.5%) of the first responders in this study have not been trained in the 
use of on-site testing devices.  Early detection and a fast response to an anthrax attack is 
extremely important – without early detection, mortality could be as high as 30,000 to 3 million 
(Hogan et al., 2007).  A speedy and well-planned response could help reduce the number of 
casualties during an attack.  For example, if treatment is administered immediately, mortality 
could be limited to less than 1% of those exposed (Hogan et al., 2007).   Preliminary test results 
from on-site testing can give first responders and staff at the laboratories an idea of the nature of 
the threat and help responders, medical officers, and laboratory personnel being immediate 
response actions.  Additionally, rapid screening and identification of substances on-site can 
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prevent expenditures related to unnecessary medical treatment and closing of businesses and 
operations (Wills, Leikin, Rhee, Tameling, Saeedi, 2008). 
 While on-site testing may be beneficial in expediting response procedures, samples must 
still be sent to the CDC’s Laboratory Response Network (LRN) for confirmation (CDC, 2003).  
The CDC states that they do “not have enough scientific data to recommend the use of these 
assays” because “the analytical sensitivity of these assays is limited by the technology, and data 
provided by manufacturers indicate that a minimum of 10,000 spores is required to generate a 
positive signal” (CDC, 2003).  These testing devices may still be very useful for heavy 
contamination, but may yield a negative signal with low-level contamination. For example, Hong 
et al., (2010) notes that “surface concentrations corresponding to acceptable risk levels are often 
very low, which questions whether a negative test result is enough to conclude that the risk is 
below the standard.”  In guidance issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS, and 
HHS, they recommend against on-site testing: “Currently, there are no definitive field tests for 
identifying biological agents. Additional field testing can mislead response efforts by providing 
incorrect or incomplete results, and destroy limited materials critical for definitive laboratory 
testing required to facilitate any appropriate public health and law enforcement response” (2004). 
Currently, the CDC is undergoing a study to evaluate the sensitivity and specificity of these 
devices, after which recommendations for use may be more valid (CDC, 2003).  With the release 
of these recommendations, specific training can be developed which addresses 1) accuracy, 2) 
how to address false negatives and/or false positives, 3) where to use them, 4) who uses them, 
and 5) how to use them properly. 
Personal Protective Equipment. The answers regarding what level of PPE and where to 
put in on varied greatly, with every level of PPE (A through D) being chosen by at least one 
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participant.  OSHA recommends Modified Level C PPE for responding to an indoor 
contaminated letter or package (OSHA, “Anthrax in the Workplace”), such as the first scenario 
presented in this survey.  For the second scenario in this survey, OSHA recommends Level B 
protection (“where anthrax spores may have been dispersed with an aerosol-generating device 
but are no longer being released”).  Level A is recommended by OSHA only when an unknown 
dispersal method has been used or if an aerosol-generating device is used and the release is still 
occurring (OSHA, “Anthrax in the Workplace”).  Following these guidelines, approximately 3% 
of participants would be under-protected in the first scenario and 11.5% (if assuming the release 
had ended, if assuming the release was ongoing this number would be 46%) under-estimated the 
level of protection they would need.  This under-protection could lead to first responders being 
exposed.  On the other hand, 64% of participants would be over-protective in the indoor scenario 
and 29% (if assuming the release had ended) would be over-protective in the outdoor scenario.  
Drawbacks to over-protection include increasing public panic and limiting the number of 
responders available due to limited PPE equipment available. 
 
Limitations 
 This study serves as a useful starting point for improving training for first responders.  
There are several limitations of this study.  First, the study does not compare the perceived 
capability of participants with their actual performance during a threat or mock event, with the 
exception of a few knowledge-check questions.  Additionally, the study may over represent the 
fire department, which could lead to biased results.  Most of the participants surveyed were 
present at a national conference in the southeastern part of the U.S., which could have introduced 
bias.  The modeling of the scenarios also has assumptions such as uniform mixing and excludes 
factors such as buildings and traffic which would influence dispersion.  This study also only 
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addresses the inhalation route of anthrax exposure and does not account for dermal or ingestion 
exposures.  Additionally, anthrax was used to represent a bioterrorism attack, but responses may 
be different for other biological agents used in terrorist operations.  
This research does not address other issues related to preparedness and training for first 
responders, such as how to assess the credibility of a threat (which was mentioned by many 
people as the major issue when deciding how to handle the response).  This study also does not 
assess issues with staffing, including getting first responders to the incident in timely ways and 
ensuring there are enough responders present to handle the incident. Lastly, issues related to 
secondary response, such as the health department, EPA, FBI, etc. are not explored in this pilot 
study. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This pilot study was performed to help identify training needs for first responders to an 
anthrax attack.  Major areas for first responder training identified include improving knowledge 
regarding personal protective equipment and understanding of anthrax dispersion, both indoors 
and outdoors.  Online training may be an effective method to increase knowledge and 
preparedness for an anthrax attack.  
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Proposed Guidance for Protecting Responders’ Health 
During the First Week Following a Wide-Area Anthrax Attack 
 
 
 
Background 
 
Purpose 
The Department of Homeland Security requests your feedback on this document, “Proposed Guidance for 
Protecting Responders’ Health Following a Wide-Area Anthrax Attack”.  Your feedback will assist us in 
finalizing this guidance informed by user experiences and operational feasibility.  While overall 
comments are valued, critical feedback in the areas of defining tiers as a strategy for determining risk of 
exposure, the use of an activity based approach rather than occupational specialties, and feedback on 
options for ensuring appropriate medical countermeasures are immediately available to the responder 
community is sought.     
 
This document provides policy recommendations for protection of personnel responding to a wide-area 
anthrax attack from exposure to Bacillis anthracis spores.  A Federal interagency working group, 
consisting of subject matter experts in biodefense, infectious diseases, and occupational health and safety, 
has developed this draft consensus guidance regarding appropriate protective measures for responders in 
the immediate post-attack environment of an aerosolized anthrax attack. This proposed guidance 
statement reflects the most current understanding of the unique environment that will exist after a wide-
area anthrax release. These recommendations will evolve with stakeholder input, scientific developments, 
and availability of new environmental monitoring techniques.  
 
Wide-Area Anthrax Attack Scenario 
This guidance applies to a particular scenario:  a wide-area anthrax attack in a large U.S. city.  These 
recommendations may not be appropriate for all biological attack scenarios, or even for all anthrax attack 
 
 
scenarios.  A wide-area, outdoor aerosol attack employing B. anthracis spores would present different 
challenges than a smaller scale or indoor anthrax attack or attacks involving other agents.  Specifically, 
these recommendations apply to a scenario in which a quantity of B. anthracis spores in a liquid or dried 
preparation is disseminated as a small-particle aerosol generated by a spraying device.  The spores could 
be released from a single point or along a dissemination line from either a ground-based (e.g., truck 
mounted sprayer) or an airborne (e.g., crop-duster) delivery vehicle.  The scenario assumes 
meteorological conditions that would favor maximum plume dissemination and could result in an affected 
area that could encompass hundreds of square miles and potentially expose hundred of thousands to 
spores.  The assumptions used to address underlying uncertainties associated with this scenario are listed 
in Appendix 1. 
 
The Response 
In the absence of rapid and effective public health intervention, the successful execution of a wide-area 
anthrax attack in a major metropolitan area could have disastrous effects.  A well designed, exercised and 
rapidly executed response is necessary to minimize catastrophic effects.  Untreated, the mortality of 
inhalational anthrax approaches 100 percent, but the timely provision of appropriate treatment can prevent 
illness and death.  Post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) with antimicrobials (antibiotics and vaccine)s 
continues to be the mainstay of protection post-exposure, – a level of protection that is further enhanced 
by pre-exposure vaccination in selected populations.  Human and animal data suggest that PEP 
administration of antibiotics taken as directed can result in a much higher level of protection when started 
within 48 hours after exposure and before the onset of clinical symptoms. 
 
Distribution and administration of antibiotics to a population at risk within 48 hours of attack increases 
the ability to save lives, maintain social order, avoid significant economic loss, ensure continuity of 
government, and preserve the public’s confidence in government’s ability to respond to an attack.  Yet, 
the logistical challenges to an effective response in the wake of a wide-area anthrax attack are significant.  
Because antibiotic PEP must be initiated prior to the onset of clinical symptoms, there is a short window 
of opportunity to ensure their availability to those exposed.  To complicate matters, we have no 
mechanisms available to accurately predict the at-risk population within an adequate timeframe.  Current 
systems do not provide for highly detailed temporal or spatial resolution around the aerosol source, nor do 
models allow for rapid or remote characterization of an area that is likely to be contaminated.   
 
The Federal Government has recognized that to minimize the effects of such an attack, two critical 
capabilities must be in place:  First, the Nation must have the capability to rapidly distribute antibiotics to 
the entire affected population before clinical symptoms appear.  (NOTE:  for planning purposes, 48 hours 
post-exposure is used as a delivery target).  Second, civil order must be maintained both to rapidly 
distribute antibiotics to the entire affected population and to ensure public safety and security.  
 
 
 
With respect to the first critical capacity, the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) contains sufficient 
quantities of antibiotics for PEP following an anthrax release.  BioWatch is a U. S. Government system 
that provides a bio-aerosol environmental monitoring and early detection of biological attacks in our 
Nation’s largest cities.   However, current BioWatch technology leaves a 12 – 36 hour lag time between 
agent release and recognition of a BioWatch Actionable Result (BAR) for anthrax.  That leaves only 12 
hours to respond to the BAR and deliver PEP to the entire at-risk population.  
 
Recognizing that local points of dispensing (PODs) may not be able to reach the entire at-risk population 
within 12 hours, an additional Federal program designed to rapidly distribute antibiotics was initiated in 
2004.  The program was designed to dispense to residences a short-term supply of antibiotics by U.S. 
Postal Service (USPS) postal carriers.  Drills were conducted in 2006 and 2007 across two to three zip 
codes in each of three cities, Seattle, Boston, and Philadelphia.  Postal carriers dispensed mock antibiotics 
to approximately 22,000, 36,000, and 55,000 housing units, respectively, in the three drills.  In these 
operational drills, dispensing took only 6–9 hours.  In addition to the time needed for delivery to 
residences, it will take time to move stocks from the SNS to the affected state(s), as well as the time 
needed to mobilize postal carriers and any security forces to assist in delivery to residences. 
 
With respect to the second critical capacity, an effective response will rely on the actions of a large 
number of responders who will enter and work in the affected area.  Mail carriers will need security 
escorts.  Since plans for distributing PEP will likely vary across Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) cities, 
the specific agencies or organizations that will provide security escorts will also vary (e.g. local police, 
National Guard under State active duty).  As part of pre-planning strategy, entities should examine and 
make provisions to ensure security for those doing the distribution.  Traditional first responders (law 
enforcement, fire, emergency medical services) will need to maintain civil order, and certain personnel 
working in critical capacities (power, water, telecommunications, etc.) will need to maintain critical 
services during the first 24 to 48 hours of the response.  An effective response must address the protection 
of both sets of responders.  Considerable planning and preparation is necessary to help ensure the 
appropriate safeguards are in place so responders are fully protected and confident that they are 
adequately protected when working in contaminated areas. 
 
Guidance documents have already been developed for protecting responders engaged in environmental 
sampling and remediation, as well as for mail carriers delivering antibiotics as part of the USPS plan for 
residential delivery.  Unified guidance for protecting other responders is now being proposed.  This 
proposed guidance does not supersede existing guidance, but rather is intended to support ongoing efforts 
in planning and preparation, and expand coverage to similarly exposed responders.  This proposed 
guidance will facilitate appropriate planning and should be refined as additional data become available.  
   
Definition of “Responders” 
 
 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) #8 defines first responders as  
 
…individuals who in the early stages of an incident are responsible for the protection and 
preservation of life, property, evidence, and the environment, including emergency response 
providers as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well as 
emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support 
personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide immediate support services during 
prevention, response, and recovery operations.   
 
This proposed guidance also defines responders broadly.  “Responders” here refers to a diverse set of 
individuals who will be critical to mitigating the potential catastrophic effects of a wide-area anthrax 
attack.  This includes professional and traditional first responders (e.g., emergency medical personnel, 
firefighters, law enforcement, and HAZMAT personnel), public health and medical professionals, skilled 
support personnel, essential workers in critical infrastructure sectors, and certain Federal and private 
sector employees and individual volunteers assisting in activities such as distribution and dispensing of 
antibiotics for PEP.   
 
Protecting Responders 
 
Overview 
While the general public (including some responders) may have been initially exposed to anthrax spores 
immediately following the attack, there will be many responders who as part of their duties may enter 
areas having increased risk of exposure.  This risk can be limited through the appropriate use of personal 
protective equipment (PPE), decontamination and hygiene procedures, and the timely administration of 
antimicrobial PEP.  Employers and/or organization sponsoring responders have an obligation to provide 
and pay for protection (e.g. PPE) and associated training to reduce responders’ exposure to the hazards.1  
Pre-planning strategies need to examine what protection may be necessary and how to ensure that it is 
readily available to responders for immediate use in the event of a wide area aerosol anthrax attack. 
 
Protective measures available to responders who may become exposed to anthrax spores include (1) use 
of personal protective equipment (PPE), (2) antimicrobial PEP, and (3) vaccination (pre- and post-
                                                          
1 For additional information, please see OSHA Standards 29 CFR 1910.120, 29 CFR 1910 Subpart I - Personal 
Protective Equipment and OSHA Document CPL 02-02-073 - Inspection Procedures for 29 CFR 1910.120 and 
1926.65, Paragraph (q): Emergency Response to Hazardous Substance Releases. 
 
 
exposure). 2  The primary objective for instituting these protective measures is to limit exposure and thus 
avert illness and death.  Although PPE is usually designed to prevent exposure, in this setting PPE is 
intended to reduce the level of responder exposure (spore burden) in appropriate situations since a 
significant proportion of the cohort may have already been exposed.  In addition, because the risk of 
secondary exposure is continuous and not definable, it may not be feasible to prevent responders 
effectively and completely from coming into contact with the hazard.  Because prevention of exposure 
cannot be assured, even with PPE, medical prophylaxis is critically important as a foundation of 
protection. 
 
Because the vaccine is not immediately effective, continuation of antimicrobial PEP until after the third 
dose of anthrax vaccine is administered is essential.  Therefore, when employed appropriately, PEP with 
effective antibiotics combined with vaccination offers the best intervention for protection.   
 
Rationale for Recommended Protections 
Normally in hazardous materials response, the source or location of the hazard, contamination 
characteristics and locations are predictable and environmental testing can delineate areas of higher and 
lower concentration.  In a typical setting, these data then form the basis for risk assessments and selection 
of appropriate protective measures.  This traditional approach is not feasible for the wide area anthrax 
scenario for which this guidance is designed because of current sampling limitations, the need to get 
antibiotics to the entire affected population within 48 hours after the attack, and the potential geographic 
extent of the contamination.  Geography or location within the affected area alone cannot be used as the 
basis for assessing responder risk.   
 
However, even though we will have limited knowledge of contaminated areas and levels of risk, it is 
possible to develop an activity-based approach to classifying the potential risk of exposure for responders.  
Responder activities that are likely to increase exposure include: environmental sampling, forensics 
sampling, decontamination, and extensive travel within the potentially contaminated area.   Risk of 
exposure increases with travel frequency and duration into one or multiple contaminated areas.  To 
address concerns that the entire responder population would be at increased risk during the first week 
after the attack, a tiered approach to classifying presumed increased risk of exposure is recommended 
based upon qualitative assessment of the probability of exposure.   
   
Potential Exposure Level Tiers 
Risk stratification among responders can be performed through identification of activities that likely 
present the highest potential exposure levels to B. anthracis spores.  Given the inherent uncertainties, a 
                                                          
2 While performing specific activities (e.g., sampling, investigation, decontamination, etc.) that place responders at 
the highest risk for exposure, administrative and engineering controls can also be effective. 
 
 
balanced, prudent, and precautionary approach is necessary.  It is important to note that these 
recommendations are activity-based rather than being based on traditional occupational duties.  Activities 
may alter responders’ tier groupings from day to day, and each responder and team leader should 
continuously re-assess activities to determine their activity tier.  The guidance builds on internal protocols 
and procedures that were developed internally for USPS workers and guidance developed for those 
engaged in environmental sampling and remediation, and expands these protocols to other responders 
who are engaged in certain activities or who must travel frequently throughout the affected area 
immediately following the incident. 
 
Definitions 
 
TIER 1 – Highest Potential Exposure Levels During Responder Activities – Highest potential exposure 
levels should be assumed for: a)  activities associated with prolonged contact with potentially 
contaminated surfaces (e.g., sampling, etc.); b) activities that place responders in areas that are likely to 
have higher spore concentration for extended periods of time; c) activities performed in areas that 
witnesses identify as a release site; and d) activities in areas identified as contaminated through sample 
measurement.  Responders engaged in these activities or working in these areas are likely to be subject to 
higher risk of exposure from environmental contamination and secondary aerosols.  All responders in this 
category should be considered to have elevated risk of exposure.   
 
Examples of Tier 1 activities include, but are not limited to:  environmental sampling and 
characterization, HAZMAT decontamination/remediation, forensics sampling, and other activities 
proximal to the suspected release site or area documented to be contaminated.    
 
TIER 23 – Increased Risk of Exposure, but not Highest Potential Exposure Levels During Responder 
Activities – Responders in this group are assumed to a) originate from within the affected area thus 
assumed to have been at least potentially minimally exposed prior to work activities and b) engage in 
extensive and/or frequent travel throughout the affected areas.  Frequent travel increases the probability of 
moving through contaminated areas and therefore increases the likelihood of additional exposure and 
increased spore burden.  Responders engaged in Tier 2 activities will likely be exposed to greater levels of 
environmental contamination and secondary aerosols during these activities, although these exposures 
would be expected to be less that those engaged in Tier 1 activities. Completion of the U.S. Postal Service 
(USPS) delivery of antibiotics will require continuous postal carrier and security escort travel across a 
large at-risk area during the first 12 hours; however, unlike some Tier 1 activities, the delivery of 
                                                          
3 Since contaminated spots will be noncontiguous with unknown locations, it is reasonable to suggest that for some 
time immediately after the primary aerosol dissipates frequent or prolonged movement outdoors is likely to increase 
the probability of traveling through multiple contaminated spots, thereby increasing exposure levels and spore 
burden.  The more movement, the greater the likelihood is of increased exposure. 
 
 
antibiotics will not necessarily require extended exposure in highly contaminated areas.  Thus, the 
activities of postal carriers and their security escorts are representative of activities in Tier 2. 
 
Examples of Tier 2 activities include, but are not limited to:  postal carriers and security escorts involved 
in antibiotic distribution, EMS, fire, rescue, police, and traffic control not otherwise supporting Tier 1 
activities. 
 
TIER 3 – Limited Risk of Exposure During Responder Activities – Responders assigned to this tier: a) 
originate from within the affected area; b) may be required to travel to and from their workplaces or, 
during the execution of their duties, may be required to make short, infrequent trips; and c) primarily 
work indoors.  In the absence of information to the contrary, it is assumed that although any travel within 
the at-risk geographic area may result in the inadvertent entry into higher-risk areas, short and direct trips 
do not carry the same probability of exposure as do Tier 2 activities. 
 
Examples of Tier 3 activities include, but are not limited to personnel who may be required to report to 
work, may be required to travel to and from their workplaces, or who, during the execution of their duties, 
may be required to make short, infrequent trips (e.g., essential staff maintaining critical infrastructure/key 
resources (CI/KR), hospital staff, mission-critical local, State, and Federal Government personnel, POD 
volunteers). 
 
 
 
Recommendations for Responder Protection4  
 
Summary of Recommendations: 
Protection Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
Antimicrobial PEP* √ √ √ 
Pre-Event Vaccination √ √ N/A 
Post-Event Vaccination √ √ √ 
Respiratory Protection √ √ NA** 
Nitrile Gloves √ √† NA** 
Protective Clothing √ √‡ NA** 
Personal Decontamination/Hygiene √€ √€€ √€€ 
*Pre-event placement should be considered for Tiers 1-3 emergency services and essential CI/KR workers who will 
need to immediately report to and remain on duty despite or because of an ongoing emergency. 
** Consider for specific situations assessed to represent increased risk. 
†For responders handling multiple potentially contaminated surfaces 
‡Consider uniform or clothing change policy.  Consider protective garments for specific activities that may 
represent increased risk for contamination of garments. 
€Full personal decontamination 
€€As appropriate to the situation; at a minimum clothing change, laundering and personal shower (at shift end or 
daily) 
 
1. Tier 1 – Responders in this group will likely encounter higher exposure to spores, increasing the risk 
for inhalational or cutaneous anthrax. 
 
Antimicrobial post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) 
                                                          
4 Most existing human data regarding anthrax antimicrobial prophylaxis, treatment, or vaccination were gathered in 
studies of occupational populations, particularly active duty uniformed service members, and most animal model 
studies were designed with these populations in mind.  While these protective measures may be relevant to 
professional responders, in a large-scale attack they may not be appropriate for all responders, such as volunteers, 
particularly those who are younger or older than most professional responders, and those who have certain medical 
conditions that may affect their susceptibility to disease or the effectiveness of protective measures. 
 
 
All responders in the Tier 1 Group should begin antimicrobial PEP as early as possible and should 
continue for the recommended duration, depending on vaccination status (at least 60 days of 
antibiotics for previously unvaccinated and at least a 30 day course for those previously fully 
vaccinated5 after the last exposure).   
 
Vaccination 
Responders likely to fall within the Tier 1 Group during an event should receive priority to receive 
pre-event vaccination.  Post-exposure, in addition to antibiotics, all responders in the Tier 1 Group 
who have not been vaccinated previously, and those requiring updated boosters, should receive 
anthrax vaccination.  Please see Recommendation 4, below.  
 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
In addition to antimicrobial PEP, responders in the Tier 1 group should adhere to existing 
recommendations related to the use of PPE when working in a contaminated environment.  PPE 
includes appropriate respiratory protection (e.g., Powered Air-purifying Respirator – PAPR), 
protective garments, and gloves, as well as appropriate training and fit testing, and decontamination 
training.  (Please see Appendix 6 for references containing guidance that is more detailed.) 
 
Personal Decontamination/Hygiene 
The potential for and extent of contamination for people operating in a wide-area post-attack 
environment are currently unknown.  With Tier 1 activities, protective clothing or other exposed gear 
is more likely to be contaminated and may be a source of further contaminant dissemination.  
Appropriate decontamination procedures are necessary.  Locations/facilities for proper 
decontamination for this higher risk group must be determined (e.g., decontamination trailers) by the 
Incident Command.  Once decontaminated, responders in the Tier 1 Group should correctly doff and 
dispose of protective clothing and respiratory protection.  Undergarments worn under protective 
clothing should be laundered or disposed of after a shift of work is completed.  Responders should 
shower with soap or undergo some other appropriate personal decontamination after a work shift.  
 
2. Tiers 2 and 3 – Responders will need to act rapidly based on consistent training and preparation.  As 
the response progresses, incident leadership may make site and activity-based decisions regarding the 
appropriate protective ensemble based on factors related to the specific event and additional 
knowledge obtained over the course of the event.  It is critical that incident commanders, other 
incident leadership, employers, and public health authorities with jurisdiction to consider additional 
                                                          
5 The initial 6-dose vaccination series is complete and booster doses are up-to-date according to ACIP 
recommendations 
 
 
information (such as sampling data, witnessed release locations, etc.) when selecting protective 
measures for responders following an attack.  
 
Antimicrobial post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP)  
All people in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 Groups should begin taking antibiotics as soon as possible and 
should continue for the recommended duration, depending on their vaccination status (at least 60 days 
for those previously unvaccinated and at least 30 days for those previously fully vaccinated after the 
last exposure).   
 
Vaccination 
Responders likely to fall within the Tier 2 Group in response to an event may be offered pre-event 
vaccination.  Post-exposure, in addition to antibiotics, all responders in the Tier 2 Group who have 
not been previously vaccinated, and those without updated boosters, should receive anthrax 
vaccination.  Please see Recommendation 5, below. 
 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)  
Tier 2 – Extensive travel or remaining outdoors for extended shifts –Responders involved in Tier 
2 activities (frequent and/or long-term travel throughout the affected area) should be provided 
respiratory protection to reduce risk of exposure and potential inhalational burden.  USPS responders 
(carriers participating in residential delivery of antibiotics) should adhere to existing USPS guidance 
regarding working in a contaminated environment.  This guidance includes N95 respiratory 
protection, gloves, and uniform change provisions.  Other Tier 2 responders (e.g., patrols, security, 
and rescue) should consider a uniform change provision similar to the USPS guidance.  Tier 2 
responders who do not wear uniforms (such as outdoor utility maintenance) should consider adding a 
uniform or clothing change policy; protective garments can be considered for specific activities that 
may represent increased contamination risk.  Consistent with existing recommendations, all Tier 2 
responders should use N95 (or more protective) respirators (with appropriate training and proper fit 
testing) while engaged in those activities as the minimum respiratory protection level to reduce the 
risk of inhalation of B. anthracis spores.  Nitrile gloves should also be considered for Tier 2 
responders handling potentially contaminated surfaces.   
 
Tier 3 – Limited travel – Responders in this group originate from inside the affected area and will 
have many duties that are not likely to present risk of exposure as high as Tiers 1 and 2, but may 
require a specific PPE program.  When specific conditions or activities indicate that there may be a 
significantly increased risk, responders and team leaders should consider the use of PPE (i.e., 
respirators, protective garments). 
  
 
 
Personal Decontamination/Hygiene 
Personal decontamination procedures are not specified for this Tier.  To mitigate potential risk, 
personal hygiene practices should be emphasized.  Undergarments worn under protective clothing 
should be disposed of after a shift of work is completed or removed and laundered with commercially 
available laundry detergent and water or dry cleaning. 
 
3. Outside responders temporarily entering the affected geographic area 
Responders who were not in the impacted region during an attack do not have the same baseline risk 
of exposure as responders who might have been in the area at the time of the attack.   Furthermore, 
responders who do not reside in the attack area may only be exposed for a short time (e.g., some 
security escorts might only be at risk of exposure for the 12-24 hours that it takes to deliver the PEP).  
Responders who originate from outside the affected geographic area (and thus do not have prior 
exposure) and remain in the affected areas only briefly should be protected in a manner similar to Tier 
1 or 2, depending on the activity.  The recommended PPE ensemble for responders coming into the 
affected area includes appropriate respiratory protection (including fit-testing), uniform or clothing 
change (and protective garments in specific instances), gloves, appropriate training, decontamination, 
post-exposure antibiotics, and vaccine.  Personnel and equipment should be decontaminated when 
exiting the affected area. 
 
4. Occupational Safety and Health Medical Surveillance and Consultation  
Before using a respirator, responders must undergo medical evaluation to determine the employee’s 
ability to use a respirator and be fit-tested for the respiratory protection they will use.6   
 
The employer’s emergency response plan must address emergency medical treatment and first aid.  In 
addition, responders must be provided access to medical examinations and consultations should they 
become injured, develop signs or symptoms of exposure to hazardous substances, or experience 
adverse events associated with prophylaxis (29 CFR 1910.120(f)).   Medical examinations and 
consultations must be provided as soon as possible following the incident, and at additional times if 
the physician determines it is necessary.  In addition, incident commanders must ensure that 
responders receive adequate training based on expected duties.  The training shall include information 
regarding risk of exposure, appropriate protective measures, and potential adverse events.7 
 
5. Pre- and post-event vaccination 
                                                          
6 For additional information, please see OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1910.134 Respiratory Protection. 
7 For additional information, please see OSHA Standard 29 CFR 1910.120 and OSHA Document CPL 02-02-073 - 
Inspection Procedures for 29 CFR 1910.120 and 1926.65, Paragraph (q): Emergency Response to Hazardous 
Substance Releases. 
 
 
• Pre-event vaccination – In October 2008, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
(ACIP) re-examined its recommendations for pre-event anthrax vaccination for responders 
likely to be involved in an anthrax post-attack response.  The committee recognized that 
while the risk of exposure for first responders to anthrax is low, it may not be zero.  Although 
emergency and other responders are not recommended for routine pre-event anthrax 
vaccination, ACIP determined that it is allowable for first responder organizations to choose 
to offer pre-event vaccination on a voluntary basis.  The vaccination should be administered 
according to the most recent FDA guidance8 and the vaccination program implemented under 
the direction of a comprehensive occupational health and safety program. 
• Post-event vaccination – Post-event, post-exposure vaccination is an essential component of 
protection for responders exposed to B. anthracis spores.  Previously unvaccinated 
responders should receive the initial vaccine dose as soon as possible and should complete a 
course of at least the first 3 vaccinations in the series (at 0, 2, and 4 weeks). 
• Vaccine Prioritization – In the event that anthrax vaccine stocks are insufficient to meet 
operational requirements, the responder community must be prepared to prioritize those most 
at risk of exposure.  Criteria for determining priorities for vaccination will be developed by 
the Federal government to assist local decision makers. 
 
6. Pre-event placement of antibiotics for certain responders and critical workers  
The goals of pre-event placement of antibiotics are to ensure continuation of mission essential 
functions without the time lag burden of acquiring and distributing antibiotics, as well as lessening 
the volume of antibiotics that must be distributed post-event.  As part of any planning effort, 
responsible parties should evaluate the feasibility of pre-event placement of antibiotics for responders 
(potentially including family members) who will need to immediately report to and remain on duty 
despite or because of an ongoing emergency. 
 
The USPS strategy for residential delivery of antibiotics includes pre-event provision of antibiotics to 
postal workers and their family members.  Using this as a model, local planners should consider 
which critical workers (and their family members) should be considered candidates for exercising this 
strategy.  Such a strategy should include pre-event medical screening of this workforce (and their 
families) to ensure there are no medical contraindications to taking these antibiotics.  Local planning 
should identify who will provide this screening (e.g. employers, public health, other).  This critical 
workforce is represented within Tiers 2 and 3 of this document. 
  
7. Planning guidance and responsibilities of incident commanders and public health authorities 
Incident commanders, as part of a Unified Command or other incident leadership, employers, and 
public health authorities with jurisdiction have the ultimate responsibility for determining appropriate 
protective measures for responders and for the general public in the setting of an emergency.  
Comprehensive planning and training is essential to ensure that responders are protected while 
performing mission essential tasks. 
                                                          
8 The December 11, 2008 revision requires an intramuscular route of administration for the vaccine.  Vaccine is 
administered in five (5) doses at 0, 4 weeks, and 6, 12, and 18 months (plus boosters). 
 
 
 
One significant assumption contained within this guidance is that Federal, State, and local planners 
have incorporated appropriate logistical mechanisms to ensure timely  availability of antimicrobial 
PEP and other protective measures for responders.  Plans  should consider local stockpiles or other 
mechanisms to ensure that responders will have immediate access to personal protective equipment 
and medical countermeasures if pre-placement in homes is not used.  (See Recommendation 6, 
above). 
 
Authorities should consider this guidance in formulating pre-event plans and incident-specific 
guidance and training, and arrange for Emergency Use Authorizations (EUAs) for the responding 
populations.  However, they should be aware of the significant information gaps and assumptions 
inherent in this proposed guidance and that information available as an incident evolves may provide 
them with better information upon which to develop better guidance.   
 
8. Alignment of initial antibiotic PEP dispensing strategies and deployment of responders to 
minimize risk of exposure to responders and population 
Although recommendations regarding the preferred modalities for initial antibiotic  dispensing during 
the first 48 hours following an attack are beyond the scope of this guidance, there are significant 
implications related to protecting responders.  The USPS plan for rapid distribution of antibiotics is 
intended to save lives of the public.  Since fewer responders are needed under this plan, a secondary 
benefit for locations utilizing this modality is the reduced number of responders exposed.  As 
mentioned, drills exercising the USPS plan for residential delivery of antibiotics have been conducted 
in Seattle, Philadelphia, and Boston.  The projected staffing requirements extrapolated from these 
drills to deliver antibiotics to all households in a metropolitan area in 6-9 hours are significantly lower 
than the total staffing required to complete the same task utilizing public health PODs.  In addition, 
the USPS plan  minimizes unnecessary travel within the affected area by advising people to remain in 
their homes; whereas the POD model requires the entire population (or heads of household) to travel 
to a POD, wait in line, receive their antibiotics, and travel back home.  Poor characterization of 
environmental contamination, risk of exposure in the first days following an attack, additional 
immediate travel within the affected area by the much larger number of responders, and the required 
travel of the affected population to come to a POD for their medication following an attack 
potentially increases risk of exposure. 
 
The USPS plan for residential delivery of antibiotics decreases the overall risk to responders by 
significantly reducing the immediate demand for conducting initial dispensing of antibiotics using 
PODs.  This option also reinforces guidance to “remain indoors or at-home” for the general public to 
assist in maintaining order which will prevent unwarranted evacuation, unnecessary travel, and help 
to limit further contamination by or spread of anthrax spores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 – Scenario, Impact, and Response Assumptions 
 
This proposed guidance is intended to facilitate planning for one particular scenario though parts of this 
guidance may be relevant to other scenarios.  Building that scenario required making a variety of 
assumptions about the nature of the attack and the resulting environmental contamination.  As specific 
information is gained about a given attack, these assumptions may change.  Furthermore, the guidance 
may change based on changes in our understanding of the behavior of the contaminant, available 
monitoring technology, and our understanding of the efficacy of the protective measures recommended.  
Thus, this guidance it is not meant to supplant the judgment of incident commanders or responders on 
scene of an actual event, who may have access to specific data that can enable better decision making.  
The most important of the assumptions associated with this guidance are listed below: 
 
Assumptions regarding attack scenario: 
 
• The release is outdoors, to a wide area, using anthrax aerosol  
• Wide-area environmental contamination is possible; this contamination will be spotty, non-
contiguous, and not predicted by models 
• The strain of B. anthracis used in the attack has not been modified or engineered to express 
resistance to antibiotics in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)  Naturally occurring strains of 
B. anthracis are susceptible to ciprofloxacin and doxycycline.  Contingency plans to address the 
threat of enhanced agents will be addressed in a different forum 
• The aerosol anthrax is not military grade weaponized   
• The aerosol attack is covert and initial notification will occur after environmental sensors, disease 
manifestation, or credible forensic intelligence provide evidence of or detect the presence of B. 
anthracis. 
 
Assumptions regarding ability to characterize environmental distribution 
• Environmental monitoring and forensic efforts is unable to provide timely information regarding 
the release, source strength, and scope/area of risk  
• Modeling is unable to accurately predict the area of risk from primary aerosol exposure, but will 
be of value to incident commanders.9,10,11 
                                                          
9 Even in the days following the attack, empirical data suggest that current plume models may only help to predict 
areas of highest probability of contamination and cannot accurately predict the extent and scope of contamination 
because of microatmospheric variability, effect of urban or other structures, lack of knowledge regarding source 
strength and release dynamics, and the travel of people and vehicles through areas. 
10 In an outdoor attack, levels of exposure to re-aerosolized spores in contaminated areas are likely to be orders of 
magnitude lower than exposure levels at the time of the attack.  Potential exposure levels from undisturbed 
contaminated environmental surfaces would be even lower. 
11 While the literature supports a protective effect of buildings from the primary aerosol, there are very scant data 
regarding building effect in the setting of persistent and low level contamination.  It is unclear whether an indoor 
environment protects against or increases potential exposure in the post-attack period. 
 
 
• There will be very limited knowledge of contaminated areas and levels of risk for the first week 
(or more) owing to the complexity of the problem and current (and foreseeable) capacity for 
sampling and testing 
• Travel within the geographical area could increase the likelihood of initial or additional aerosol 
exposure by inadvertent entry into areas of higher contamination or more prone to aerosolization 
 
Assumptions regarding population exposure: 
 
• By the time an attack has been detected through BioWatch, people may have been traveling in 
and out of affected areas for 12 – 36 hours or more  
• Everyone within this area is considered at some level of risk for secondary exposure for the entire 
duration of their presence in the area, although the specific risk is not predictable  
• Commuting and traveling of people in and out of the potentially affected area will complicate risk 
assessment and increase contamination  
• A large number of people in a broad geographical area will inhale potentially lethal doses of B. 
anthracis spores but it will not be possible to determine specifically which people are infected.  
All people in that area will require antimicrobial PEP immediately.  
 
Assumptions regarding response: 
 
• The use of anthrax vaccine in combination with antibiotics would be authorized under an 
Emergency Use Authorization following specific steps by the U.S. Government to declare a 
public health emergency (Nightingale SL, Emerg Infec Dis, 2007) or under an Investigational 
New Drug (IND) application in the absence of those actions 
• The immediate dispensing of antibiotics to the population at risk may rely on the U.S. Postal 
Service (USPS) plan or other “push” methods that involves postal carriers with law enforcement 
escorts delivering antibiotics (time to dispense ranges from 8-9 hours).  Other modalities (public 
health PODs, retail PODS, employer PODs) will begin operation following an attack but will 
likely require more time to become fully operational and complete their task of dispensing 
antibiotics to the population at risk 
• Most responders originate from inside the at-risk geographic area, and therefore will have been at 
risk for exposure from the primary aerosol 
• All public transportation in and proximal to the aerosol release will be affected   
• Responders who originate from outside the affected geographic area will be moving from a status 
of essentially no likely exposure into an area that places them at continuous risk for exposure to 
B. anthracis spores through secondary aerosolization 
• “Remain indoors or at-home” guidance may be issued to the population to enable distribution of 
antibiotics, assist in maintaining order, and prevent unwarranted evacuation and unnecessary 
travel; this guidance will be situation dependent and will realistically not be effective for more 
than 48 hours12 
                                                          
12 Avoiding unnecessary travel within the geographic area could reduce overall public health risk by reducing the 
likelihood that those who unknowingly have been in a low-risk area will unknowingly travel into a high-risk area. 
 
 
• Despite the issuance of “stay at home” orders, large numbers of the general public may self-
evacuate after notification of an attack or may have to travel out of doors to obtain antibiotics or 
essential supplies.  Others may need to travel within the geographic area in their role as 
responders, to maintain uninterrupted essential services, and to sustain critical infrastructure 
• In addition to traditional “first responders,” there are a number of other responders who will be 
critical during the first week following an anthrax attack including essential employees across 
critical infrastructure sectors who cannot abandon their responsibilities and must provide 
uninterrupted services immediately following an attack (e.g., hospital and nursing home staff, 
prison guards, airport security, border guards, and those staffing telecommunications, electrical 
power, water facilities) 
• Most responders and essential personnel will potentially receive high enough doses to lead to 
development of inhalational anthrax for the entire time they remain in the region and may be at 
risk for developing inhalational anthrax for a period of time after they leave the potentially 
contaminated area, depending on the level of inhaled B. anthracis spores (spore burden) 
• Demand for antibiotics will likely extend beyond the geographic boundaries of the affected area 
and could complication efforts to provide them to those requiring them. 
• Epidemiological trending/mapping will be undertaken but may not be able to fully assess the 
potential contaminated zones 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Protective Measures 
 
The most effective way to protect responders is to prevent spores from initially entering the lung.  
Normally, this would be accomplished using primary interventions such as engineering controls (e.g., safe 
havens, isolation, and ventilation), proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE), work practice 
modifications, and limiting access and duration in the affected area.  However, this scenario assumes 
there will be a 12-36 hour delay between the attack occurrence and recognition of the same.  Therefore, 
primary controls for response personnel residing within the contaminated area will almost certainly not be 
implemented in time to prevent initial spore inhalation.  For this scenario, these are adjunct measures to 
reduce the level of additional exposures as responders perform their duties. 
 
Note that the ability to determine risk will be limited, and that it is likely that exposure will not be 
uniform for responders residing inside the affected area.  It is probable that there will be significant 
differences in initial exposure amongst this responder group.  Some local responders may not have been 
exposed at all during the attack (e.g., they live up wind, were indoors in a controlled environment, were 
out of town on the day of attack, or live in an unaffected area), and traveling into the hazard area would 
therefore increase in their risk.  PPE and other controls for this sub group, and for the numerous 
unexposed responders arriving from outside the affected area, could be effective in preventing initial 
exposure if used according to these recommendations.  However, because prevention of exposure cannot 
be assured, medical prophylaxis is of critical importance as a foundation of protection. 
 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
Normally, PPE is considered a primary intervention because it prevents inhalation or skin contact with B. 
anthracis spores from occurring.  Depending on the circumstances (tasks, duration, specific area), N95 or 
higher-rated respirators can provide significant protection from inhalation of B. anthracis spores, if the 
user is properly fitted to the respirator, wears the respirator properly and for the required durations, and 
the respirator is appropriately removed and discarded or decontaminated.  If worn properly, powered air 
purifying (PAPR) or supplied air respirators (SAR) can offer increased respiratory protection against 
inhaling B. anthracis spores and are recommended for certain activities, including environmental 
sampling, conducting remediation activities, or when there may be aerosol-generating devices or 
activities.  
 
Procedural and Engineering Controls 
Procedural and engineering controls can be effective when there is knowledge of what locations and 
activities could possibly constitute an increased hazard. 
 
 
 
Antimicrobial Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) 
When inhaled into the lungs, B. anthracis spores germinate into active, growing bacteria that release toxin 
and cause the disease manifestations of inhalational anthrax.  Spores generally germinate to cause disease 
within a few days, but some spores can remain dormant for weeks or months before germinating.  The 
complex series of events that leads to germination is unclear, but antibiotics are only effective against 
actively growing organisms; they have no effect on dormant spores.  For this reason, antibiotics are 
recommended for at least 60 days following the last potential exposure for previously unvaccinated 
individuals. 
 
Unfortunately, compliance with taking antibiotics for extended periods can be challenging.  In a study of 
antibiotic compliance following the 2001 attacks, completion of the full 60-day regimen ranged from 21-
64 percent, depending upon location.  Although a significant proportion of those who stopped taking 
antibiotics cited adverse events, only 0.3 percent of the 2,135 people followed after 30 days were 
determined to have serious adverse events associated with antibiotic use.  Statistical analysis and 
anecdotal experience of antibiotic compliance after the 2001 attacks suggest that those who are indeed at 
significant risk (and those who perceive that they are at elevated risk) have significantly higher 
compliance rates.    
 
Doxycycline and ciprofloxacin constitute the bulk of the oral antibiotics in the Strategic National 
Stockpile.  Both are highly effective against B. anthracis, are licensed for use against anthrax, and are 
considered the two first-line agents of choice for anthrax.  Human and animal data suggest that the use of 
an effective antibiotic taken as directed can result in nearly 100 percent protection when started within 48 
hours after exposure and before the onset of clinical symptoms.  Data from non-human primates support 
efficacy even after a dose > 1,500 times the 50 percent lethal dose (LD50).  Modeling of exposure from 
spore-containing letters indicates that some people exposed to the letter in Senator Daschle’s office may 
have been exposed to similarly high levels, and none that were promptly provided antibiotics (and later 
with vaccination) presented with clinical anthrax.  When antibiotics are promptly initiated after exposure, 
failure in animal models has only been seen after cessation of antibiotic use, a phenomenon attributed to 
the long latency period of some spores in lung tissue. 
 
The duration of antibiotic use is critical to effective protection.  Animal data suggest that if an individual 
has no immune protection, antibiotics must be continued until virtually all inhaled spores have been 
cleared from the lungs, since only the vegetative form of the organism is affected.  Currently, the number 
of remaining spores within the lungs cannot be accurately measured.  Modeling of spore germination and 
clearance kinetics suggest that complete clearance may take longer than 60 days for large doses, and 
animal studies have found viable spores up to 90 days after exposure.  Although data is lacking regarding 
antibiotic efficacy in the setting of repeated exposure to anthrax spores and the cumulative amount of 
spores inhaled, prudence and common sense support a second objective of minimizing the continued 
inhalational burden of anthrax spores with PPE.  Recommendations for the use of PPE to ensure effective 
 
 
achievement of this second objective requires an understanding of potential environmental contamination 
and risk of exposure.  In the absence of information specific to contamination levels, it is prudent to 
believe that some activities may increase the probability of exposure, and that responders employ 
recommended use of protective equipment until additional information is available to suggest otherwise. 
 
Antimicrobial PEP and Pre and Post-Exposure Anthrax Vaccination 
The currently recommended course of antibiotics post-exposure is at least 60 days following last potential 
exposure in previously unvaccinated individuals.  Following high-level exposures, some experts 
recommend a longer course in the absence of post-exposure vaccination.  Pre-event vaccination with 
anthrax vaccine provides protection from all forms of anthrax.  Antibiotics may still be recommended to 
those who have been fully vaccinated.  If large doses of spores are inhaled, it is possible that spores may 
germinate, producing sufficient amounts of toxin to cause disease before an adequate immune response 
can be achieved.  In the absence of definitive data to clarify the degree of protection provided by 
vaccination alone, the recommended duration of antibiotic use is 30 days for exposed individuals who 
have previously completed the primary anthrax  vaccination series and who are current with boosters.   
 
Although antibiotics should be given for a prolonged course, studies suggest that anthrax exposure 
followed by administration of antibiotics post exposure generates no significant protective immune 
response, leaving no residual protection.  Anthrax vaccine, on the other hand, has been demonstrated to 
impart significant protective immunity against B. anthracis.  All available data (predominantly from non-
human primate studies and one small human clinical field trial) indicate that pre-event vaccination with 
the licensed U.S. anthrax vaccine, BioThrax (Emergent BioSolutions, Lansing, MI formerly known as 
anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA)), is effective in protecting against development of anthrax disease.  
Supplementing these data with additional non-human primate data focused on post-exposure prophylaxis, 
a PEP regimen of anthrax vaccine and antibiotics provides protection from developing inhalation anthrax 
even after completion of the recommended antibiotic regimen.  CDC’s Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices (ACIP) and independent expert committees and advisory bodies have concluded 
that the optimal means to prevent illness after suspected or confirmed inhalation exposure to aerosolized 
B. anthracis spores associated with a biological attack is post-exposure prophylaxis comprising a 60-day 
course of antibiotics in conjunction with anthrax vaccination in a three-dose regimen (0, 2, and 4 weeks).  
People who are engaging in longer term (weeks to months) potential exposure may require protection 
beyond that provided by antibiotics and post-exposure anthrax vaccine, and would benefit from a licensed 
regimen of pre-exposure vaccination to confer this longer-term protection.  In 2000, ACIP recommended, 
“pre-exposure use of anthrax vaccine should be based on a quantifiable risk for exposure.”  ACIP 
reaffirmed that recommendation in 2008, and also permitted that likely responders can be offered pre-
event vaccination.  Working under the assumption that access to the contaminated area could be 
controlled after the initial incident, responders would not be expected to have longer-term potential for 
exposure, and antibiotics would be adequate to protect them.  The scenario of this guidance assumes 
wide-area contamination, which would mean that local responders would be at risk for long-term 
exposure. 
 
 
Appendix 3 – Antibiotic Dispensing to the General Public 
 
Multi-Layered Strategy for Dispensing Antibiotics Post Exposure 
Current efforts to accelerate dispensing focus on adjunctive modalities for quick push of antibiotics into 
affected communities.  The Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI), started in 2004, is a Federally funded effort 
to prepare major U.S. cities and metropolitan areas to respond effectively to a large-scale bioterrorist 
event by dispensing antibiotics to their entire affected population within 48 hours of the decision to do so.  
The CRI project started in 21 cities and has grown to include 72 CRI Metropolitan Statistical Areas that 
encompass 490 counties in all 50 states.  To help guide State local, territorial and tribal planners, the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has identified several dispensing modalities: 
1. Pre-event placement of medications in households.  Pre-event placement of caches of antibiotics 
(MedKits) in households that are to be reserved for use during a declared public health 
emergency.  A pilot study was successfully conducted in St. Louis to test the feasibility of pre-
event placement of MedKits in households.13  This study showed that the vast majority (over 
95%) of those households stored their kits properly.  They returned stored kits to the study team 
intact and unopened.  However, this study did not test each person’s understanding of the 
instructions on the package.  Overall, procedures need to be developed to validate proper storage, 
use, and shelf life of kits.  In October of 2008, a Public Health Emergency Declaration was 
declared by the Secretary of Health and Human Services based on the established, material threat 
determination and consequences of a widespread attack with B. anthracis spores.  This 
declaration allowed a request for an Emergency Use Authorization for the use of home MedKits 
pre-event for Postal workers.  This provision of MedKits is currently under discussion with the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
2. Pre-deployment of community-based caches of medications.  Pre-deployment of antibiotics in 
community-based caches that will function as points of dispensing (PODs) might include 
churches, schools, large employers, or fraternal organizations within a community.  This option 
may include the development of retail PODs (operated by businesses to provide antibiotics to 
their employees and the public) or closed PODs (operated by organizations to provide antibiotics 
to their employees and their family members). 
3. Postal Plan: Home delivery of antibiotics by the United States Postal Service (USPS).  The Postal 
Plan was conceptualized as a way of increasing the speed of dispensing of antibiotics and 
reducing the population surge at PODs.  With this modality, mail carriers with security escorts 
deliver initial doses of antibiotics directly to homes. 
4. Points of Dispensing (PODs).  The PODs concept was initially developed to address the smallpox 
threat and is the public health preferred method of providing vaccine prophylaxis at designated 
dispensing locations for people who are currently healthy but may have been "exposed."  As it 
relates to anthrax, the role of the POD has been extended to dispense antibiotics to affected 
members of a community.  However, given the amount of time needed to establish and operate a  
fully functional POD, coupoled with delay in detection mentioned earlier , the critical initial 
doses of antibiotics will likely not be able to be delivered to all those potentially infected within 
48 hours of an attack. 
The dispensing modalities outlined by HHS provide a framework for rapidly distributing antibiotics.  It is 
apparent that any effective system will involve a mix of several modalities including traditional PODs, 
                                                          
13 http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/prep/pdf/medkit-evaluation-summary-2007.pdf 
 
 
employer PODs, postal carrier distribution, and private sector retail chain distribution.  The workload 
required to distribute countermeasure will include a varying mix of traditional responders and volunteers 
totaling, for a large metropolitan area, thousands of “responders” just for countermeasure distribution.   
 
If the USPS Plan is used as a first strike capability for distributing and dispensing initial doses of 
antibiotics, then planning must include pre-event screening of USPS personnel and their families, 
provision of antibiotics to personnel and their families, personal protective equipment (PPE) availability, 
appropriate training, and proper fit-testing.   
 
Countermeasure distribution will constitute only a fraction of the total response to a large anthrax attack.  
As noted earlier, responders will be involved in a variety of activities, including environmental sampling 
and characterization of the contaminated area, crime scene investigation and forensics, law-enforcement 
and security to maintain of civil order, and medical care.  Furthermore, maintaining continuity of 
operations throughout the response will require personnel that operate and maintain critical infrastructure 
and key resources.  Therefore, the actual number of responders in this scenario may exceed 100,000 in 
some large regions.  It is a critical planning function for each sector to independently examine risk of 
exposure to their employees and plan, prepare, and stockpile accordingly. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the efficacy of an initial response will likely hinge upon the maintenance 
of calm and orderly reaction of the community.  The distribution and dispensing of life-saving antibiotics 
relies on the smooth and effective operation of logistical and transportation systems and the throughput or 
flow of people (responders and the affected public) through systems that deliver antibiotics.  
Psychological studies of humans in crisis situations and experience in previous disasters indicate that 
public confidence will remain high if there is perceived (1) open flow of accurate information, (2) 
effective government response, and (3) rapidly accessible antibiotics for all who require it.  Additional 
studies suggest that nontraditional responders are more likely to report to and remain on duty if they and 
their families are provided adequate PPE in addition to PEP.  Low public confidence in these areas may 
lead to panic and social disorder that likely may result in cascading consequences.  This creates a tenuous 
balance upon which may rest the success of response.  It is essential to have open, honest risk 
communication with the general public.  People will be strongly urged to stay in place for up to 48 hours 
to ensure the roads are clear, responders can travel to the site, and medication (e.g., antimicrobial PEP, 
including antibiotics and vaccine) can be dispensed to individuals in the area. 
 
Appendix 4 - Using Anthrax Vaccine in a Post-exposure (post-event) Situation 
 
Anthrax vaccine is approved for post-exposure use to be administered under an Investigational New Drug 
(IND) protocol.  This program provides the use of the licensed product, BioThrax, for the unapproved 
 
 
indication of post-exposure prophylaxis using a shorter duration of time and fewer doses compared to the 
approved regimen. As outlined in the IND protocol, the post-exposure prophylaxis program is intended to 
provide a 3-dose regimen (0, 2 weeks, 4 weeks) of anthrax vaccine (BioThrax ™, formerly known as 
AVA) as an emergency public health intervention to prevent inhalation anthrax among people exposed to 
potentially aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores.   
 
Post-exposure prophylaxis must include BioThrax in conjunction with 60 days of selected oral antibiotics.  
Two of these, ciprofloxacin and doxycycline, have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) for this indication but the other, amoxicillin, has not.  Therefore, the program is made available 
under an Investigational New Drug (IND) application to comply with regulations concerning the use of 
approved products for investigational indications.   
 
All participants must sign an informed consent form before being allowed to enroll in the program.  The 
program, consent form, and progress reports will undergo continuing review by CDC Investigational 
Review Board at least annually in accordance with Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 
56.109.  The currently approved protocol has been approved by the CDC IRB until November 2008. 
 
In October, 2008 the Secretary of Health and Human Services declared under section 564(b)(1)(B)(C) an 
emergency based on: the determination of the Secretary of Homeland Security that there is a domestic 
emergency, or a significant potential for a domestic emergency, involving a heightened risk of attack with 
a biological agent anthrax; and the determination of the Secretary of Health and Human Services of a 
public health emergency under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act that affects, or has the 
potential to affect, national security, and involves the biological agent anthrax.  CDC could request use of 
anthrax vaccine as a part of PEP through an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) as a medical product 
for use in emergencies pursuant to section 564 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.  This EUA 
allows BioThrax™ to be used in combination with antibiotics to protect civilians, emergency response 
personnel, and health care providers who were exposed to anthrax spores or bacteria following an 
intentional release due to an act of bioterrorism or as the result of a public health emergency.  An EUA 
has facilitates the rapid implementation of anthrax vaccine administration, thereby allowing more rapid 
administration to the appropriate populations at risk.   
 
 
 
Appendix 5– Knowledge Gaps 
 
Additional study and information regarding the following items will allow for better characterization and 
allow for further refinement of anthrax protection guidance: 
 
• Improved characterization of environmental hazards after wide-area release including: 
o Degree and extent of contamination (including resuspension and fate and transport) 
o Improved modeling to predict contamination 
o Risk of secondary re-aerosolization and activities to avoid to limit re-aerosolization 
o Duration and time kinetics of contamination 
o Impact of rain or other dilution factors on outdoor contamination 
o Indoor versus outdoor contamination characterization  
o Effects and determinants of cross-contamination via vehicle or human activity.  
Assessment of magnitude and evaluation of interventions to minimize cross-
contamination. 
 
• Required duration of antibiotic PEP including: 
o Variation with exposure dose 
o Variation with addition of anthrax vaccine 
 
• Protective efficacy of vaccine in preventing inhalation anthrax including: 
o Contingencies not covered in current ACIP recommendations, e.g., when initial 6-dose 
series in incomplete, booster doses are not up to date 
o Post-exposure vaccine recipients who are eligible for pre-exposure vaccine by their 
activities 
o Local responders whose exposure potential may not be related to activities as much as by 
their living in a contaminated area 
o Multiple exposure levels and prolonged exposure 
o Using abbreviated or truncated vaccination regimens 
 
• Safety and efficacy of alternative routes of anthrax vaccine administration to reduce adverse side 
effects 
 
• The prioritization of vaccine either for logistical or inadequate supply needs 
 
• Correlation of immune protection to enable research and predict risk  
 
• Safety and efficacy of vaccine and antibiotic PEP in special populations 
 
• Emergency Use Authorization application process for responder populations  
 
 
 
• Efficacy, feasibility and technical requirements of improvised collective protection areas for 
responders coming from outside the hazard area and therefore not exposed to the primary 
dispersal (e.g., expedient isolation, safe havens) 
 
• Method development for rapid human decontamination using low or no water techniques.  
Methods and guidance for determining the efficacy of decontamination. 
 
• Development of rapid, effective decontamination capacity and capabilities necessary after a wide 
area release 
 
Finally, this guidance should be reviewed in 18 months to assess the status of existing knowledge and 
decide whether updated guidance on protecting responders after a wide-area anthrax attack can be 
generated. 
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